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I. AN OVERVIEW
Of course, the first thing to do was to make a frand survey
of the country she was going to travel through.
It's a good bet that if you pull a copy of your state's statute
book off of the shelf and open it at random, you will find
somewhere on the page in front of you a reference to other
legislation. It may be a reference to one of your state's
administrative rules or to the United States Code. More likely, it is
a cross-reference to another section of the state's statutes.2 Most of
these references are intended to have the legal effect of
incorporating 3 the text of the referenced material into the adopting
1. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 149 (Signet Classics
2002) (1865).
2. The widespread use of cross-references was noted in Ernest Means,
Statutory Cross References-The "Loose Cannon" of Statutory Construction in
Florida, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1981). His study found that of the 16,000
sections in the Florida Statutes in 1975, some 5,500 contained cross-references.
Other states reported comparable numbers. The California Code has been
compared to a "Russian nesting doll" because of its many references within
other references. Scott A. Baxter, Reference Statutes: Traps for the Unwary, 30
MCGEORGE L. REv. 562, 563 (1999).
3. To "incorporate," after all, literally means to put into a body. The
phrase "incorporation by reference" is further defined as a doctrine in law in
which "the terms of a contemporaneous or earlier writing, instrument, or
document capable of being identified can be made an actual part of another
writing, instrument, or document by referring to, identifying, and adopting the
former as a part of the latter." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1145 (3d ed. 1981). Further discussion of incorporating references
is found infra Part II.A.3.
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statute. Such incorporation by reference is not a new technique; it
was used in an act of Parliament over seven hundred years ago.4
The use of such a simple, historic, and common drafting
technique might at first seem relatively risk free, but nothing could
be further from the truth. The legislative drafter or legal
practitioner unfamiliar with the arcane legal doctrine applicable to
referential legislation may well be surprised when a ke)y piece of
legislation s is interpreted in an unexpected manner or even
declared completely invalid.7 A reference statute may seem to the
uninitiated to be only a simple reflection of the referenced
material, but like the world in Alice's looking glass, on close
examination it often proves to be quite a bit more complicated.
4. See Horace Emerson Read, Is Referential Legislation Worthwhile?, 25
MiNN L. REv. 261, 262 (1941).
5. The term "legislation" is used here in a very broad sense. It covers any
published governmental requirement or restriction that is generally applicable
and has the force and effect of law, including constitutions, federal statutes,
regulations, state statutes, rules, and county and municipal ordinances.
6. Courts have often given restrictive interpretations to incorporating
references quite clearly intended to include future changes to the referenced
documents. In Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 257 (Fla.
1976), the statute at issue adopted rules of the Federal Trade Commission "as
from time to time amended." The Florida Supreme Court decided that the
statute "intended" for the Department of Legal Affairs to conform its rules only
to those Federal Trade Commission regulations and decisions in effect on or
before the effective date of the Florida law, expressly noting that any other
"construction" would render the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 267. Related
cases are discussed infra note 235 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Lee v. State, 635 P.2d 1282 (Mont. 1981) (holding
unconstitutional a delegation to require state authorities to adopt speed limits
required under an incorporated federal law); State v. Rodriguez, 379 So. 2d
1084 (La. 1980) (holding it unconstitutional for a statute to delegate to a federal
agency or Congress the legislature's power); State v. Dougall, 570 P.2d 135
(Wash. 1977) (holding it unconstitutional to permit future federal designation of
controlled substances to automatically become controlled in Washington); State
v. Grinstead, 206 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1974) (holding an attempted incorporation
of future federal law controlling LSD unconstitutional); Idaho Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. Roden, 350 P.2d 225 (Idaho 1960) (holding provisions delegating to
the Congress power to make future state laws governing appellant's business
unconstitutional); Dawson v. Hamilton, 314 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1958) (holding a
state statute unconstitutional to the extent that it adopted time standards to be
fixed in the future by Congress). Other cases are discussed infra note 228 and
accompanying text.
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Although the doctrine may be arcane, most states 8 follow
common principles when incorporating by reference.
Nevertheless, opinions seldom explain the applicable interpretive
canons in any detail. Instead, the reader is left to piece the
complete conceptual quilt together from small bits and pieces
gleaned from the cases. This Article traces the development of this
complicated doctrine and attempts to explain it more
comprehensively. Part II begins by distinguishing various types of
references, and then, focusing on incorporation, describes how a
basic incorporative reference is construed by the courts. Part III
goes on to explain how courts expanded the classic doctrine
through consideration of legislative intent. Part IV evaluates the
judicial presumption created to infer intent and some issues this
presumption has created. In Part V, the knotty interplay between
incorporation by reference and the non-delegation doctrine is
addressed, with special attention to intergovernmental relations.
The Article concludes with suggestions intended to facilitate
statutory interpretation consistent with legislative intent, while at
the same time supporting cooperative federalism within the
constraints of the non-delegation doctrine.
II. THE CLASSIC DOCTRINE
You can just see a little peep of the passage in Looking-
glass House, if you leave the door of our drawing room
wide open: and it's very like our passage as far as you can9
see ....
A. Typology of References
Although the term "referential legislation" most often means
incorporation by reference, in its broadest sense it also includes
other types of references. 10 Because these other references have
8. This Article primarily focuses on Florida law, but cites cases from
throughout the states. While there are naturally some variations, the general
history and issues discussed here have broad application.
9. CARROLL, supra note 1, at 131 (Alice).
10. Cecil Carr, Legislation by Reference and the Technique of Amendment,
22 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT'L LAW 12, 12 (1940), notes that the term reference
legislation covers some distinct drafting processes.
1204 [Vol. 68
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very different legal consequences and can be confused with
incorporative references," it is helpful to begin with a brief
typology. This Article classifies legislative references into three
types, according to their effect: informational, amendatory, and
incorporative. 12
1. Informational References
A legislative reference is termed "informational" if its only
effect is to alert the reader to the existence of additional
information or other material that might be of interest. An
informational reference therefore neither affects the material to
which it refers nor is in any way affected by it.' 3 In one sense,
then, informational references have no real legal effect at all.
Informational references are rare. They sometimes occur when
several governmental entities exercise concurrent jurisdiction. A
provision of the Florida Statutes, for example, sets forth certain
legal protections available to members of the United States Armed
Forces under Florida law. It then goes on to state, "In addition to
these state provisions, federal law also contains protections, such
as those provided in the Service members' Civil Relief Act
(SCRA) . . . ,14 It is clear from this wording that the federal
protections are distinct from the Florida ones, and that the
reference is made only to provide information. 15 Similarly, two or
11. See, e.g., State v. J.R.M., 388 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 1980) (holding that an
amendatory reference is incorporative); Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 39 Pa.
Super. 338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1909) (holding that an incorporative reference
violated prohibition on amendatory references).
12. While these particular titles may not always be used in cases or
commentary, the basic concepts have long been recognized. See John W.
Brabner-Smith, Incorporation by Reference and Delegation of Power--Validity
of "Reference" Legislation, 5 GEO. WASH. L. REV, 198, 208 (1936); Carr, supra
note 10, at 12; Arie Poldervaart, Legislation by Reference-A Statutory Jungle,
38 IowA L. REV. 705, 705 (1953); Read, supra note 4, at 262.
13. Unlike an incorporative reference, no penalty or benefit can be assessed
or withheld by the entity making the reference as a consequence of failure to
meet the referenced standards, requirements, or prohibitions. Unlike an
amendatory reference, no addition or modification is made to the scope or
application of the referenced material.
14. FLA. STAT. § 250.82(1) (2007).
15. A later subsection of the Florida Statute provides that state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the federal statute to the extent allowed by
2008] 1205
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more governmental entities sometimes require permits for the same
activity, and make informational references to another jurisdiction's
independent licensing requirements.16
Informational references present few legal issues when they are
used. The principle concern is that they may be misinterpreted as
another type of reference, so the wording of an informational
reference should make it quite clear that neither amendment nor
incorporation of the referenced material is intended.
2. Amendatory References
A legislative reference is "amendatory" if its effect is to amend
or revise the legislation to which it refers. The requirements of the
referenced legislation may be changed in some fashion, or the
sphere of application of the referenced legislation may be
contracted or expanded. 17
The case of Central & Southern Florida Flood Control District
v. Okeelanta Sugar Refinery, Inc. 18 provides a simple example of
an amendatory reference. The Florida Supreme Court held that a
1959 law which amended section 4, chapter 30542 of the Laws of
Florida to "be in full force and effect until terminated by law" was
an attempt to change the expiration date of an existing law, and so
constituted an amendatory reference.
Use of an amendatory reference in state legislation is widely
prohibited or restricted by constitutional provisions. 19 Amendatory
federal law, § 250.82(2), but there is no attempt to incorporate the federal statute
as part of Florida substantive law.
16. This is not to be confused with a situation in which one government
requires compliance with another entity's regulations as a condition for receipt
of the first government's permit. This latter type of reference is clearly
incorporation.
17. It is sometimes difficult to determine whether a reference is anendatory
or incorporative. In State v. Varela, 636 So. 2d 559 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1994),
the court concluded that a statute providing that escape from a juvenile detention
facility "constitutes escape within the intent and meaning of s[ection] 944.40"
was an incorporative reference, rather than an amendatory reference expanding
the scope of section 944.40.
18. 168 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1964).
19. Most states have constitutional provisions prohibiting amendment of
laws by reference: ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 45; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 14;
ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 23; CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 9; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 24;
FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6; GA. CONST. art. III, § V, III; IDAHO CONST. art. III, §
1206 [Vol. 68
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references have long been condemned as making interpretation of
enacted statutes and their relationship to one another impossibly
complex, allowing unscrupulous legislators to covertly amend
laws, and generally permitting legislation to be enacted without
proper deliberation. 20 As Judge Cooley explained:
The mischief designed to be remedied was the enactment of
amendatory statutes in terms so blind that legislators
themselves were sometimes deceived in regard to their
effect, and the public, from the difficulty in making the
necessary examination and comparison, failed to become
apprised of the changes made in the laws. An amendatory
act which purported only to insert certain words, or to
substitute one phrase for another in an act or section which
was only referred to but not republished, was well
calculated to mislead the careless as to its effect, and was,
perhaps, sometimes drawn in that form for that express
purpose. Endless confusion was thus introduced into the
law, and the constitution wisely prohibited such
legislation.2'
The wording of Florida's Constitutional prohibition is typical:
article III, section 6, provides in part, "No law shall be revised or
amended by reference to its title only. Laws to revise or amend
shall set out in full the revised or amended act, section, subsection
or paragraph of a subsection." Similar prohibitions may be found
in the Florida Statutes applicable to legislation by state agencies, 22
counties, 23 and municipalities. 2
4
18; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(d); KAN. CONST. art. 2, § 16; Ky. CONST. § 51; LA.
CONST. art. III, § 15(B); MD. CONST. art. III, § 29; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 25;
MISS. CONST. art. 4, § 61; MO. CONST. art. III, § 28; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 14;
NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 17; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § VII, 5; N.M. CONST. art. IV, §
18; N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 16; N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. II, §
15(D); OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 57; OR. CONST. art 4, § 22; PA. CONST. art. 3, § 6;
TEx. CONST. art III, § 36; VA. CONST. art IV, § 12; WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 37;
W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 30; WYo. CONST. art. 3, § 26.
20. See generally Brabner-Smith, supra note 12; Poldervaart, supra note 12,
at 705; Read, supra note 4, at 262.
21. People exrel. Drake v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481 (Mich. 1865).
22. Florida Statutes section 120.54(1)(i), part of Florida's Administrative
Procedure Act, provides in part, "No rule may be amended by reference only.
2008] 1207
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It should be emphasized that these prohibitions apply only to
laws that would expressly revise, amend, extend, or revive prior
acts; they do not apply to incorporative references, which instead
adopt the terms of an old act into an independent new act.2 5 The
Amendments must set out the amended rule in full in the same manner as
required by the State Constitution for laws."
23. Florida Statutes section 125.67, relating to county governments,
provides in part, "No ordinance shall be revised or amended by reference to its
title only. Ordinances to revise or amend shall set out in full the revised or
amended section, subsection, or paragraph of a subsection."
24. Florida Statutes section 166.041(2), relating to municipalities, provides
in part, "No ordinance shall be revised or amended by reference to its title only.
Ordinances to revise or amend shall set out in full the revised or amended act or
section or subsection or paragraph of a section or subsection."
25. In earlier years, a few courts held that incorporative references were also
prohibited by these constitutional provisions. See Doud v. Citizens' Ins. Co., 6
Pa. C.C. 329 (Pa. Com. P1. 1889) (holding that Pennsylvania's constitutional
provision meant that "when the provisions of a former law are to be
incorporated with a subsequent statute, they, or the law containing them, shall be
re-enacted and published at length"). The exclusion of incorporative references
from constitutional prohibitions against amendment by reference is now well
established, however. See Keener v. City of Kendallville, 191 N.E.2d 6 (Ind.
1963) (holding an act relating to off-street parking facilities does not amend, but
rather incorporates other laws; therefore article 4, section 21 has no application);
Ballew v. Denson, 320 P.2d 382 (N.M. 1958) (holding that an incorporation by
reference statute did not contravene article 4, section 18 of the New Mexico
constitution); In re Opinion of the Justices, 81 So. 2d 277 (Ala. 1955) (holding
that a constitutional provision forbidding amendment by title not applicable to
acts that merely adopt by reference the provisions of other laws on same
subject); Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. Yelle, 200 P.2d 467 (Wash. 1948) (holding
incorporation by reference statutes were not within prohibitions on amending by
title); State v. Waller, 55 N.E.2d 654 (Ohio 1944) (holding the effect of
incorporation of existing law is not to revive or continue in force the statute
referred to but to carry into execution the statute in which the reference is
made); State ex rel. Berthot v. Gallatin County High Sch. Dist., 58 P.2d 264
(Mont. 1936) (holding a reference adopting a pre-existing statute was not
"amendatory" nor repugnant to a constitutional provision barring amendment by
reference to title); Serv. Feed Co. v. City of Ardmore, 42 P.2d 853 (Okla. 1935)
(holding an act in form was original and in itself intelligible and complete and
not revisory or amendatory of any existing law in violation of the constitution);
Campagna v. City of Baton Rouge, 116 So. 403 (La. 1928) (holding a statute
directing contracts to be pursued in the manner "now provided by law" did not
attempt to revive or amend any particular law, but merely referenced existing
laws); Ex parte Burke, 212 P. 193 (Cal. 1923) (holding that incorporation by
reference is proper legislation and is not prohibited by constitutional article 4,
section 24); Poe v. Street Improvement Dist. No. 340, 252 S.W. 616 (Ark. 1923)
(holding that an act providing for improvements under laws applicable to
original districts did not violate constitutional article 5, section 23, as
amendment by reference); Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 78 So. 693 (Fla. 1918) (holding
LOOKING GLASS LAW
two types of references are most easily distinguished by
determining which legislation is made operative by the referencing
statute: if the new legislation is made applicable, adopting the
terms of the old legislation within it, the reference is incorporative;
but if the old legislation itself is made applicable, as changed by
the new legislation, the reference is amendatory.
26
The two types of references are discussed in State ex rel.
Attorney General v. Green, which involved a law creating the city
of Pensacola that incorporated an 1889 statute governing state
elections to describe how the city elections were to be held. 7 The
same legislative session also repealed the 1889 elections statute
and created a new elections code.28 The repeal took effect two
days prior to the effective date of the law creating the city of
Pensacola. The election was held pursuant to the 1889 statute and
challengers sought to invalidate the election, claiming the
Pensacola act had improperly amended or revived the repealed
1889 election statute.2? Since the new law was the operative one,
the Florida Supreme Court held that there had been no attempt to
amend or revive a repealed statute; rather there had only been an
incorporation of a repealed law by reference. 30 Nevertheless, the
two types of references can be confused.3'
that article III, section 16 does not apply to incorporative, only amendatory
references); People v. Crossley, 103 N.E. 537 (Ill. 1913) (holding that a
referencing act complete within itself does not amend or revive any other act);
State v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 110 P. 92 (Kan. 1910) (holding a 1909 law
supplemental, not amendatory, and so did not violate state constitution article 2,
section 16).
26. Poldervaart, supra note 12, at 709. See also Panama R.R. Co. v.
Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 389 (U.S. 1924) (holding a referenced law contributes
nothing in the field to which it is translated; the strength comes altogether from
its inclusion in the referencing law); W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Young, 339 S.W.2d
277 (Tex. App. 1960) (holding a law incorporated into and made part of the
other does not operate by its inherent force, but takes its effect from the statute
in which it is incorporated).
27. 18 So. 334 (Fla. 1895).
28. Id. at 338.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 339.
31. A few cases have even attempted to apply constitutional prohibitions
against amendment by reference when the incorporative reference was to the
legislation of a different legal entity: State v. Armstrong, 243 P. 333 (N.M.
1924) (holding a statute adopting by reference penal provisions of the National
Prohibition Act was a violation of New Mexico Constitution article 4, section 18
'12092008]
0LOUISIANA LA W RE VIE W
3. Incorporative References
While informational references and amendatory references are
interesting drafting techniques in their own right, this Article
focuses on the incorporative reference. A reference is
incorporative if its effect is to adopt the standards, requirements, or
prohibitions of the referenced material as its own standards,
requirements, or prohibitions. An incorporative reference occurs
whenever legislation references material outside of itself and
indicates expressly or by implication that this material should be
treated as if it were fully set forth at that point in the legislation.
The requirements of the referenced material are then said to be
"incorporated into" or "adopted into" the legislation that adopted
them, without the necessity of printing the text verbatim.
Incorporation by reference is a feature of legislation at every
level and has been used in some interesting ways. The current
Florida Constitution incorporates by reference some provisions of
the old 1885 constitution, but then sets them forth verbatim
anyway.32 A Florida Statute incorporates the common law and
statutes of England down to the fourth day of July, 1776."3 And
every year the general statutes and laws of the state are themselves
incorporated into a single revision and consolidation that becomes
as an attempt to extend the provisions of the federal act); Commonwealth v.
Dougherty, 39 Pa. Super. 338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1909) (holding that reference
incorporating federal definition violated a prohibition on amendatory
references).
The concerns behind these early cases appear to be similar to those expressed
in cases applying the non-delegation doctrine. But it is difficult to logically
accept that these constitutional prohibitions were intended to apply to the
legislation of another entity--which a state would of course have no legal
authority to amend by reference or otherwise. Adding to the confusion is the
fact that a very few states have constitutional provisions that were evidently
drafted to restrict incorporative references as well as amendatory references.
Though as noted infra note 54, the courts have given extremely limited effect to
these provisions.
32. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(e), and the footnotes thereto.
33. FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (2007). Florida Statute section 775.01 also adopts
the common law of England in relation to crimes without a termination date.
Both statutes were enacted in 1829 and in fact come into play in case law with
surprising frequency. See, e.g., Fla. Dep't of Corr. v. Abril, 969 So. 2d 201 (Fla.
2007). Poldervaart, supra note 12, at 732, says that most states have similar
provisions. But see LA. CONST. art. III, § 15(B) ("No system or code of laws
shall be adopted by general reference to it.").
[Vol. 681210
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the Florida Statutes. 34  Federal statutes adopt state law;35
municipalities adopt both state law36 and federal statutes;37 state
statutes adopt state agency regulations,38 county ordinances,
39
federal statutes, 40 and federal agency regulations; 41 and state
regulations adopt state statutes, 42 federal regulations, 43 and federal
statutes.44 Examples could be further multiplied, but the point is
that these ubiquitous references form an extremely complicated
web of legislative interconnection. Also, on top of this, all levels
of government incorporate publications and specifications of
private entities.45
B. Authority and Procedures to Incorporate
A few attempts at utilizing incorporation by reference in
legislation have been met with challenges to the concept itself For
34. The general adoption of the Revised Statutes through incorporation in a
subsequent act was expressly sanctioned as constitutional by the Florida
Supreme Court in 1893 in Mathis v. State, 12 So. 681 (Fla. 1893). The Florida
Legislature has for some time used the permanent statutory revision system.
Beginning with the 1999 regular session, the Reviser's Adoption Act
incorporating the Florida Statutes has been submitted to the Legislature
annually. See FLA. STAT. §§ 11.241-.2425 (2007).
35. See, e.g., Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2006) (adopting
the criminal law of the state in which federal enclaves are situated and making it
applicable within those areas under federal law).
36. See, e.g., Off v. Quigg, 185 So. 726 (Fla. 1938) (municipal
incorporation of state misdemeanors).
37. See, e.g., Wright v. Worth, 91 So. 87 (Fla. 1922) (municipal
incorporation of the Federal Volstead Act).
38. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 380.0551 (2007) (designating the Green Swamp
Area as an "area of critical state concern" and expressly incorporating several
chapters of the Florida Administrative Code).
39. See, e.g., § 380.0555(8)(a)(2) (incorporating certain zoning ordinances
of the Franklin County Board of County Commissioners).
40. See, e.g., § 220.03(1)(n) (referencing the United States Internal Revenue
Code; subsequent sections adopt it for various purposes).
41. See, e.g., § 316.46 (2007) (requiring compliance with motor vehicle
safety standards contained in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations).
42. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 14-22.0011(5)(g) (2007)
(incorporating a definition of "Certified General Appraiser" from the Florida
Statutes into the rule).
43. See, e.g., R. 64F-12.001 (incorporating definitions contained in Title 21
of the Code of Federal Regulations by reference).
44. See, e.g., R. 6C4-6.0021(7)(c)(2) (adopting the definition of "violent
misconduct" in section 16 of Title 18 of the United States Code).
45. See, e.g., § 163.3209 (requiring vegetation maintenance and tree
pruning conducted by utilities to conform to ANSI A300 standards).
20081 1211
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example, a New Jersey case 46  concluded that it was
unconstitutional for the state to adopt the existing provisions of
another state's statute.47 The rationale of many of these early cases
was often that the hearings, debates, reports and deliberative
processes involved in the legislative process had been improperly
sidestepped by the summary adoption of the existing law of
another jurisdiction.48
As a general rule, however, the authority for a body to adopt
other material by reference is considered to be an inherent part of
the general power to legislate. 49 As one early Texas case concluded,
The practice of making the provisions of one statute
applicable to another by a reference to the former law in the
new act is of frequent occurrence in legislation, both in
England and in this country, and such legislation has been
uniformly recognized as valid, so far as we have been able
to discover.
50
Reference statutes have been recognized as nothing more than
a convenient way of creating provisions parallel to those in other
legislation without unnecessary repetition.51
No special "incorporating" language is required in the
reference itself,52 and the mere mention of external material
46. Wilentz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 172 A. 903 (N.J. Ch. 1934), cited in
Poldervaart, supra note 12, at 719.
47. The case did not involve an attempt to prospectively adopt changes that
might be made in the future. The attempt to adopt future changes to referenced
legislation of another jurisdiction is widely recognized as an unconstitutional
delegation of power. See infra Part V.
48. Poldervaart, supra note 12, at 720.
49. Note, however, that the Florida Supreme Court has held that Florida
municipalities have no power to adopt published codes or public records by
reference, except to the extent that authority has been expressly granted by
statute. State ex rel. McFarland v. Roberts, 74 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1954). Florida
Statutes section 165.191, relied upon in the opinion as providing such authority,
was repealed in 1974. It should be noted that this case recognizes that the
narrower power to adopt state misdemeanors as local offenses is based upon
constitutional charter and does not require express statutory authorization. See
further discussion infra note 237 and accompanying text.
50. Quinlan v. Houston & Tex. Cent. Ry. Co., 34 S.W. 738, 741 (Tex. 1896).
51. Surrency v. Winn & Lovett Grocery Co., 34 So. 2d 564, 564-65 (Fla.
1948).
52. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 468
N.E.2d 1339 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that four appendices to the federal
1212 [Vol. 68
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constitutes an incorporation if it is necessary to consult the material
to complete the meaning of the referencing legislation. 53 However,
special restrictions or procedural requirements applicable to
referential legislation are not uncommon and may be imposed by
constitution, statute,55 or rule.56  One difference in adoption
RCRA rules mentioned without any particular "incorporating" language became
part of state law).
53. Sometimes applicable statutes do require specific language to affect an
incorporation. FLA. STAT. § 120.55(1)(a)(4) (2007) ("The reference shall
specifically state that the form is being incorporated by reference and shall
include the number, title, and effective date of the form and an explanation of
how the form may be obtained.")
54. At least four state constitutions appear on their face to restrict the use of
incorporation by reference to some extent: LA. CONST. art. III, § 15(B) ("No
system or code of laws shall be adopted by general reference to it."); N.J.
CONST. art. IV, § VII, 5 ("No act shall be passed which shall provide that any
existing law, or any part thereof, shall be made or deemed a part of the act or
which shall enact that any existing law, or any part thereof, shall be applicable,
except by inserting it in such act."); N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 16 ("No act shall be
passed which shall provide that any existing law, or any part thereof, shall be
made or deemed a part of said act."); N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 13 ("No bill may be
amended, extended, or incorporated in any other bill by reference to its title
only, except in the case of definitions and procedural provisions."). Louisiana's
provision may be intended to protect its unique Civil Code. In Means, supra
note 2, at 2, it is noted that the courts have declined to give literal effect to the
New Jersey and New York provisions on the grounds of practical expediency
and have routinely allowed incorporation of procedural law.
55. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(i) (2007) (providing that agencies
subject to Florida's Administrative Procedure Act may only incorporate material
in existence on the date their rule is adopted). Thus by operation of law no
changes to referenced material made after a rule was adopted are ever included
in any incorporative reference found in the Florida Administrative Code. This
statutory restriction is presumably intended in part to reinforce constitutional
limitations on delegation, discussed infra Part V. But the plain language of
Florida Statutes section 120.54(l)(i) also applies to references to forms,
manuals, and other materials created by the agency itself, where no such
constitutional concerns arise. The broad statutory language thus serves the
additional purpose of ensuring that the rulemaking procedures of chapter 120 are
followed each time agency policy is changed, by requiring the amendment of the
incorporating rule each time a form, manual, or other material created by the
agency is altered. In the absence of such a statutory restriction, and consistent
with the American Convention discussed infra Part III, an agency could change
its policy simply by rewriting its incorporated manual, without going through
the rulemaking process established in the statute. Strictly read, this statutory
prohibition against incorporation of any future changes also applies to all
incorporative cross-references to other portions of the agency's own rules, but
because in such cases the referenced material has itself gone through the
complete rulemaking process, it seems unlikely that a court would so hold.
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procedure involves the "reading" of incorporated material. The
reading of a statute or ordinance, usually several times, is a
common and traditional part of legislative processes.57 The
purpose of the reading requirement is to inform and focus the
attention of legislators and allow for the passage of time before
voting in order to foster deliberation by the enacting body.58
Reading of the material incorporated by reference in legislation is
not generally required, however:
In the reading of a bill, it seems to be sufficient to read the
written document that is adopted by the two houses; even
though something else becomes law in consequence of its
passage, and by reason of being referred to in it. Thus, a
statute which incorporated a military company by reference
to its Constitution and by-laws, was held valid
notwithstanding that the Constitution and by-laws, which
would acquire the force of law by its passage, were not read
in the two houses as a part of it.
59
The exemption for incorporated material may make sense as a
practical matter because incorporated material is often very
extensive and may be very technical in nature. In any event, the
usefulness of reading has been greatly diminished with modem
forms of communication, 60 and it is now often limited by
56. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. iS-1.005 (2007) (restricting the
materials that may be incorporated in the rules of state agencies).
57. For a general discussion of reading requirements, see Adrian Vermeule,
The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361
(2004).
58. See, e.g., Casey v. S. Baptist Hosp., 526 So. 2d 1332, 1336 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1988) (holding that a readings requirement of the Constitution intended
to facilitate informed and meaningful deliberation on legislative proposals);
State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769, 772-73 (Alaska 1980) (holding
that the purpose of a reading requirement is to ensure deliberation prior to
passage); Witmer v. Polk County, 270 N.W. 323, 327 (Iowa 1936) (holding that
the purpose of a constitutional provision requiring the reading of a bill before
passage is to let every legislator know exactly what he is voting upon).
59. 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF
THE AMERICAN UNION 289 (8th ed. 1927), quoted in Tanner v. Premier Photo
Serv., Inc., 125 S.E.2d 609, 614 (W. Va. 1962).
60. State v. Kaufman, 430 So. 2d 904, 907 (Fla. 1983) (holding that
widespread publication of copies of bills means that reading a bill's number or
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constitution or rule to a reading by title,6' so this usual exclusion
for incorporated material 62  is probably of little practical
consequence.
A second requirement not usually applied to incorporated
material is publication. As a general rule, not only state statutes
and local ordinances, but also administrative regulations must be
published.63 However, material that has been incorporated by
reference usually 64 need not be published along with the code that
short title alone identifies which bill is being considered and meets
constitutional requirement of reading by title).
61. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 7 (1980) (decreeing bills are to be read by title
only, unless one-third of the members present desire it be read in full).
62. Tanner, 125 S.E.2d at 611-16 (holding that the reading required by
constitutional article 6, section 29 is the reading of a bill as drafted, and not
material referred to therein); Santee Mills v. Query, 115 S.E. 202, 204-05 (S.C.
1922) (holding that a statute incorporating by reference provisions of the Federal
Income Tax Act does not violate the South Carolina Constitution article III,
section 18 "reading" requirement, which requires only a reading of the bill as
drafted); Bibb County Loan Ass'n v. Richards, 21 Ga. 592 (Ga. 1857) (holding
that an act incorporating a county Building and Loan Association was valid
despite the fact that its incorporated constitution and by-laws were not read).
63. Some state constitutions require filing or publication of agency rules:
City of Kirkwood v. Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, 478 S.W.2d 690, 699 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1972) (holding a state constitutional provision required regulations of all
state boards and agencies to be filed for publication in the office of the Secretary
of State); People v. Fogerty, 219 N.E.2d 801, 801 (N.Y. 1966) (holding the
constitution provided that no rule or regulation made by any state department is
effective until filed in office of the Department of State); Whitman v. Wis. Dep't
of Taxation, 4 N.W.2d 180, 186 (Wis. 1942) (holding that state constitution
article 7, section 21 provides that a rule of an administrative body does not
become effective until published). Other states require publication by statute:
Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. Foster & Kleiser, Inc., 365 So. 2d 224, 225 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a state rule was invalid if not filed with the
Department of State within the prescribed time); State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. of N.
Canton Exempted Village Sch. Dist. v. Holt, 186 N.E.2d 862, 863 (Ohio 1962)
(holding rules of administrative agencies are invalid until properly filed with the
Secretary of State); State ex rel. Villines v. Freeman, 370 P.2d 307, 309 (Okla.
1962) (holding that any rule or regulation of state agency not published by the
state librarian shall be void and of no effect); State v. Wacker, 344 P.2d 1004,
1008 (Ariz. 1959) (holding a statute required regulations promulgated by a state
agency to be filed with the Secretary of State); Maestas v. Christmas, 321 P.2d
631, 633-34 (N.M. 1958) (holding a state statute required rules and regulations
of various state departments to be filed with the state librarian).
64. There is some authority to the contrary, primarily in cases involving
zoning by municipalities, generally decided upon the grounds that specific
requirements have been violated. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. McNally, 95
N.W.2d 153, 154 (Neb. 1959) (holding an ordinance void for failing to comply
with a statute requiring any ordinance prescribing a penalty to be published).
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adopts it.65  Indeed, reduction in the size and complexity of
published codes is the principle reason material is incorporated
rather than being set forth verbatim in the first place. Thus text
that has already been printed in other places in the code or in
external documents is omitted, to be replaced by citation, and the
resulting code becomes shorter and easier to read. The cost, of
course, is that the legislation as published is now incomplete, and
the reader must obtain a copy of the adopted material to determine
the meaning of the legislation.
A third procedural requirement unique to incorporated material
involves filing. Perhaps to accommodate the fact that incorporated
materials can be too voluminous to be efficiently published but at
the same time too obscure for citizens to easily locate without help,
Similar municipal restrictions often involve the material that can be
incorporated, as discussed in notes 69-81 and accompanying text. See also
State, Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Fla. Project Dirs. Ass'n, 368
So. 2d 954 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (finding invalid an incorporation by
reference of a forms index that had to then be consulted to get the list of forms
because it did not meet the express statutory requirement that forms be listed by
rule).
. 65. In the early case of City of Napa v. Easterby, 18 P. 253 (Cal. 1888), it
was argued that maps and books incorporated by reference in a municipal
ordinance had to be published along with the ordinance, but this argument was
rejected as leading to absurd consequences: "all that is required to be published
is the ordinance itself-the thing which is entered in the ordinance book." Id. at
255. This is the general rule. See, e.g., Raymond v. Baehr, 163 N.W.2d 51, 53
(Minn. 1968) (holding that a building code incorporated by reference into a
validly published ordinance was not invalid for lack of publication under a city
charter requiring publication of ordinances); City of Hazard v. Collins, 200
S.W.2d 933, 935 (Ky. 1947) (holding that incorporated material enacted into
law by reference need not be published in the ordinance book); City of Tucson
v. Stewart, 40 P.2d 72, 75 (Ariz. 1935) (holding the publication of an ordinance
adopting by reference the city's electrical code was sufficient); City & County
of Denver v. Bargan Land & Inv. Co., 267 P. 405, 406 (Colo. 1928) (holding
that a referenced map need not be published when on file in the manager's
office); Ex parte City of Albany, 106 So. 200, 202 (Ala. 1925) (holding a code
was not required to be published in extenso as a part of the ordinance adopting
it); People v. Kavanaugh, 507 N.Y.S.2d 952, 957 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1986) (holding
that adoption by reference of federal rules and regulations into state rules did not
require publishing of federal regulations); People v. Poyma, 283 N.W.2d 707,
709 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that when an ordinance is adopting a code,
the code need not be published in full, but the ordinance adopting the code must
be); Reisdorf v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Mountainside, 277 A.2d 554,
575 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971) (holding that where a map incorporated in
an ordinance was available for inspection, publication of the ordinance was not
in violation of the publication statute).
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special filing requirements often apply.66  When material is
incorporated by reference in Florida administrative rules, for
example, the material being adopted must be filed with the
Department of State along with the rule.67 This provides public
access to a definitive version of all referenced material, thereby
avoiding issues of unconstitutional vagueness that might otherwise
arise if it was not clear exactly what material was referred to by its
description alone.
68
C. Material to Be Adopted
In addition to these special procedures, there are sometimes
restrictions on the type of material that can be incorporated by
reference. One restriction is that incorporated material must
constitute a public record. This requirement is linked to the filing
requirement just discussed. In some jurisdictions, it has been held
that the act of filing the adopted material along with the ordinance
is not sufficient to make it a public record. Rather, the material
66. See Buchholz v. City of Oriska, 611 N.W.2d 886, 887 (N.D. 2000)
(holding that a statute granting municipalities the power to adopt material by
reference requires the filing of a copy of the material for public use and
examination); N.Y. State Coalition of Pub. Employers v. N.Y. State Dep't of
Labor, 457 N.E.2d 785 (N.Y. 1983) (interpreting article IV, section 8 of the
New York Constitution to require a complete copy of incorporated material to
be filed with the Department of State); City of Alamogordo v. McGee, 327 P.2d
321, 325 (N.M. 1958) (holding that an ordinance itself contained data on
boundaries of the district and referenced a map already on file with the city
clerk, where anyone could inspect it was sufficient, although the filing
requirement was not technically complied with); Fierst v. William Penn Mem'l
Corp., 166 A. 761, 763 (Pa. 1933) (applying statutory requirement that
ordinance adopting material must indicate place where material is on file and
can be examined); B&T Express, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 763 N.E.2d 1241,
1250 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (holding that statute required filing of not only rule
text but also print and electronic versions of adopted federal law with the
Secretary of State and others).
67. Rule 1S-1.005(2) of the Florida Administrative Code provides in part,
"The agency incorporating material by reference shall file with the Department
of State a correct and complete copy of the referenced material with an attached
certification page which shall state a description of the referenced material and
specify the rule to which the referenced material relates."
68. See the discussion of vagueness in referential legislation infra Part
II.D.3.
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must be an existing public record at the time the incorporation is
made.69 As explained by the Supreme Court of Michigan:
An ordinance sometimes may refer to a public record
already established by lawful authority and become
effective without publication of such record as part of the
ordinance. But Exhibit A was drafted solely for the
purpose of the ordinance and to define the fire limits, had
no prior official approval, and had no purpose, use, force,
or official sanction except as it was given by and as part of
the ordinance. An ordinance cannot at the same time
establish a paper as a public record and also incorporate it
by reference as a previously established public record.
Without publication of the map, the ordinance was not
published in full, did not comply with the statute, and is
void.7 °
This requirement that material constitute a public record before
it can be adopted by reference is commonly limited to
municipalities and has been imposed both by statute71 and judicial
decision. 72  While the filing requirement discussed earlier
addresses availability after adoption, the "public record" limitation
69. See, e.g., Fierst, 166 A. at 763 (holding that an ordinance incorporating
a zoning map that was attached to it only upon filing did not meet the
requirement of describing the place where the incorporated material was on file
and could be examined).
70. Village of Durand v. Love, 236 N.W. 855, 856 (Mich. 1931).
71. See, for example, State ex rel. McFarland v. Roberts, 74 So. 2d 88 (Fla.
1954), which discusses Florida Statutes section 165.191 (1953), authorizing
municipalities to incorporate by reference public records, defined as only those
adopted "prior to the exercise by the municipality of the authority to adopt or
incorporate by reference as herein granted." (emphasis added). The statute was
repealed in 1974.
72. See Raymond v. Baehr, 163 N.W.2d 51 (Minn. 1968) (holding that a
code drawn by the city engineer and a committee of the council and approved
prior to incorporation qualified as a public record); City of Hazard v. Collins,
200 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1947) (holding an incorporation invalid because the
document must be approved by the law making body of the city and made a
public record before it is incorporated); City of Tucson v. Stewart, 40 P.2d 72
(Ariz. 1935) (holding that the electrical code of the city of Tucson was a public
record before it was incorporated, because it had been approved by the mayor
and the council of the city of Tucson and lodged with the proper custodian);
L.A. Thompson Scenic Ry. Co. v. McCabe, 178 N.W. 662, 664 (Mich. 1920)
(holding that a building code incorporated by reference was a "fugitive paper" in
the custody of the city clerk and was not a valid public record).
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is more specifically designed to ensure that referenced material is
well known or easily obtained by both legislators and the public at
the time it is being considered for adoption.
73
Other jurisdictions impose restrictions on the type of material
that may be referenced for similar reasons. For example, a rule of
the Florida Department of State74 requires material incorporated in
administrative rules in Florida75 to be "generally available" to
affected persons76 and "published by a governmental agency or a
generally recognized professional organization." Since these are
limitations on what material may be referenced, it might be
73. Orval Etter, Referential Practices in Municipal Legislation, 39 OR. L.
REV. 209, 242 (1960). See also FLA. STAT. § 120.55(2)(d) (2007) (requiring, as
part of Florida's Administrative Procedure Act, that the Florida Administrative
Weekly website allow a user to view agency forms to be incorporated by
reference in rules of state agencies before those rules are adopted, similarly
reflecting a concern with public notice prior to adoption).
74. Rule 1S-1.005 of the Florida Administrative Code provides:
(1) Any ordinance, standard, specification or similar material may be
incorporated by reference in a rule adopted pursuant to Section 120.54,
F.S., and Rule 1S-1.002, F.A.C., subject to the following conditions:
(a) The material shall be generally available to affected persons.
(b) The material shall be published by a governmental agency or a
generally recognized professional organization.
(2) The agency incorporating material by reference shall file with the
Department of State a correct and complete copy of the referenced
material with an attached certification page which shall state a
description of the referenced material and specify the rule to which the
referenced material relates.
75. Florida Statutes section 120.54(l)(i), as amended by chapter 2001-75 of
the Laws of Florida, provides that the Department of State "may prescribe by
rule requirements for incorporating materials by reference pursuant to this
paragraph." It is not entirely clear if this authority extends solely to the
procedural aspects of incorporation, or, if the grant of authority does allow the
Department to prescribe substantive limitations, what statutory standard governs
its discretion.
76. In Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Project
Directors Association, 368 So. 2d 954 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), the court
apparently applied similar language found in former Model Rule 28-3.035 of the
Florida Administrative Code (June 10, 1980). Though the exact basis of the
decision is hard to distill from the opinion, the court stated that the incorporation
of a Departmental Forms Index into department rule did not comply with the
model rules, which only permitted incorporation of material "generally available
to affected persons;" therefore, the court held the incorporation and the rule
invalid. Id. at 955. In reading the opinion, it should also be noted that until
1984, Florida Statutes section 120.53(1)(b) required in part that an agency
"[a]dopt rules of practice setting forth the nature and requirements of all formal
and informal procedures, including a list of all forms and instructions used by
the agency in its dealings with the public" (emphasis added).
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reasonable to conclude, in the fashion of the municipal ordinance
cases mentioned above, 77 that they cannot be satisfied by the filing
and publishing that occurs after adoption; but no cases addressing
this issue have been found.
There are occasionally other restrictions as to the type of
material that may be incorporated. Incorporation is often limited
to standards, specifications, or similar material.78 Building codes
and manufacturing standards must be comprehensive and contain
considerable detail if they are to perform their intended function of
creating consistency. Other descriptions are best expressed
through maps, plans, or graphics and are not easily translated into
words. Incorporation of these types of standards and specifications
reduces not only time-consuming enactment processes but also the
voluminous text that must ultimately be published. Restricting
adoptions to these types of materials is presumably intended to
prevent abuse of incorporation when it is not necessary. Other
cases restricting the adoption of penalty clauses 79 or limiting
incorporations to procedural law 80  seem to reflect state
constitutional considerations.
In the absence of such affirmative restrictions, it is possible to
incorporate almost any material. One memorable illustration was
the observation that federal law might direct the Postal Service to
77. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
78. See Hillman v. N. Wasco County People's Util. Dist., 323 P.2d 664 (Or.
1958) (holding that a statute providing electrical installations in the state should
be made in accordance with national electrical code, as approved by the
American Standards Association); Seewar v. Town of Summerdale, 601 So. 2d
198 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (discussing a statute that limited municipal
incorporations to technical and other like codes published in books or
pamphlets, such as those pertaining to construction of buildings, installation of
plumbing, fire prevention, parks, airports, and housing). Rule 1S-1.005 of the
Florida Administrative Code limits incorporated material to an ordinance,
standard, specification, or similar material. See supra note 74.
79. State ex rel. McFarland v. Roberts, 74 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1954) (discussing
Florida Statutes section 165.191, enacted in 1953, which authorized
municipalities to incorporate public records but expressly prohibited the
adoption of a penalty clause by reference); Manning v. City of Lebanon, 124
S.W.3d 562 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a statute allowing cities to
adopt codes by reference prevented the adoption of penalty clauses and required
that penalty clauses be set forth in full in the adopting ordinance).
80. Ballew v. Denson, 320 P.2d 382 (N.M. 1958) (holding that only
procedural law may be adopted by reference under state constitution article IV,
section 10).
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act in conformity with the inscription engraved on the General Post
Office building in New York City.
8 1
D. Some Preliminary Issues
In considering the legal results that follow from incorporation
by reference, it is helpful to understand that use of the technique
creates a new and previously nonexistent legal requirement. Thus
before enactment of the adopting legislation there exists only the
referenced material, but after enactment it is as if there were a
separate copy of this material in existence incorporated within the
new adopting legislation. 82  Just as if we were simultaneously
viewing an object and its reflection in a clear mirror, we should
find it difficult to tell the difference between the original and this
copy: they would appear identical in every way.
Under classic incorporation doctrine, referenced material takes
on this separate existence as part of the adopting document, just as
if the words of the referenced material had been actually set forth
in full on the page where it was referenced. Understanding that the
new legal requirement exists not as any part of the referenced
material itself, but rather as a duplicate or "clone" of the referenced
material that has been created within the adopting legislation
83
makes it much easier to resolve many of the issues that arise.
1. Determining Which Legislation Applies
When a legislative body adopts precepts from other
legislation-whether that of its own making, or that of some
81. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of
Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1488 (2000). At footnote 177,
Siegel supplies the familiar words of Herodotus, "Neither snow nor rain nor heat
nor gloom of night stays these couriers from the swift completion of their
appointed rounds." Id. at 1488 n.177.
82. Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 78 So. 693, 698 (Fla. 1918) ("The two statutes exist
as separate, distinct, legislative enactments, each having its appointed sphere of
action ... ").
83. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Green, 18 So. 334 (Fla. 1895) clearly
illustrates that the efficacy of the law adopting the incorporated material is
completely independent of the legal effect of the law containing the material
being referenced. In Green, the referenced material was part of a statute that
had no legal effect at the time of the incorporation, because it had been repealed
before the law containing the adoption even took effect. Id. at 335.
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external legislative body--questions can later arise as to which
piece of legislation is actually being applied. Is it the adopting
legislation or the referenced legislation? 4 With an incorporative
reference, a violation of the referenced requirements is a violation
of the incorporating legislation, to be enforced under the authority
of the entity that adopted the requirements.
In Weithorn v. Adelstein,8 the City of North Miami Beach
enacted an ordinance that incorporated the Florida election code by
reference. A complaint filed in circuit court alleging violation of
the ordinance was dismissed, and the District Court of Appeal
affirmed. The court held that any violation of the municipal
ordinance had to be prosecuted in the same manner as a violation
of any other ordinance of the municipality, and the municipal
charter lodged such jurisdiction in municipal court.86 Though the
state might have brought an action under the statute itself, a
violation of the adopting ordinance was a distinct offense that the
city had to bring in the usual fashion.8 7 While the principle is
generally well understood that a government entity adopting
language from another entity's legislation is not thereby gaining
any authority to enforce the other's legislation-but instead is
simply exercising its own authority that happens to be couched in
identical terms--confusion occasionally arises.
88
84. This question is somewhat parallel to the distinction between
amendatory and incorporative references, discussed supra notes 25-31 and
accompanying text.
85. 201 So. 2d 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
86. Id. at 644. See also Baker's Supermarkets, Inc. v. Dep't of Agric., 540
N.W.2d 574 (Neb. 1995) (holding that the court's jurisdiction to consider the
validity of a statute incorporating administrative regulations was under the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act rather than the Administrative Procedure
Act, providing review of administrative regulation under petition for declaratory
judgment).
87. Issues involving the possibility of double jeopardy are discussed infra
Part II.D.4.
88. If proper procedures have otherwise been followed, scrivener's errors or
incorrect references resulting from such confusion have been considered
harmless error. See City of Litchfield v. Thorworth, 169 N.E. 265 (Ill. 1929)
(holding that errors in charging documents alleging violation of a referenced
state statute in addition to a violation of the referencing ordinance that was
actually being prosecuted constituted a surplusage that did not mislead or affect
the prosecution).
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2. Jurisdictional Limits
Except as expressly limited, the basic ability to incorporate by
reference is now regarded as inherent in the power to legislate.
This is not to say, of course, that a legislative body may necessarily
use the technique in any given case, or on any given subject; for it
is clear that use of this drafting technique in no way expands the
jurisdiction of the incorporating entity.89 Issues therefore arise as
to whether or not the government entity has authority to legislate
with respect to the subject matter of the referential provision.
In Dismukes v. Town of Louisville, a municipal ordinance
purporting to incorporate the entire state criminal code was held
invalid because under the applicable law the town had authority
over only misdemeanors, not felonies. 90 In other cases, rather than
invalidating the legislation in its entirety, courts have allowed
application of the referenced material only to the extent of the
referencing entity's authority.91 Incorporations by an administrative
agency or special purpose government entity similarly must fall
within the more limited scope of that entity's charter,
notwithstanding that general law or another entity's ordinance or
rule independently mandates compliance with additional
requirements.
92
In similar fashion: a state statute that constitutionally may
address only a single subject is not exempted from that
requirement because the second subject is adopted by reference; 93
89. Goodman v. Kendall Gate-Investco., Inc., 395 So. 2d 240 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 198 1) (holding that adopting other statutes by reference was proper when it
was not in conflict with organic law or enabling statute).
90. 57 So. 547 (Miss. 1912).
91. See, e.g., Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Smith, 57 So. 29 (Ala.
1911) (holding a municipal ordinance incorporating all misdemeanors under
state law valid as to those misdemeanors over which the municipality had
authority).
92. Council of Lower Keys v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 429 So. 2d 67
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the Florida Department of
Environmental Regulation was not required or authorized to deny air pollution
permit for failure to comply with local zoning ordinances or land-use restrictions
because issuance of permit was based solely on compliance with applicable
pollution laws).
93. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp. v. Korshak, 217 N.E.2d 794 (ll. 1966)
(holding that it was permissible to incorporate by reference into a new act
material that is germane to the subject expressed in title of new act, but matter
cannot be included by reference which could not have been included directly).
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a municipality without authority to create certain misdemeanors
cannot do so by adopting them by reference; 94 and a state agency
that cannot directly confer its authority on a federal agency cannot
do so indirectly through incorporation. 95 Similar examples could
be listed, but attention to the obvious point that the authority of a
government entity is in no way expanded because reference
legislation is utilized provides the answer to most issues that arise.
96
3. Other Grounds of Invalidity
Reference legislation by its very nature is particularly
vulnerable to challenges of vagueness. 97  Referenced materials
must be described with reasonable particularity so that a person of
ordinary intelligence is properly advised of the conduct that is
mandated or prohibited. In State v. Rodriquez, the appellees
argued that statutory language prohibiting the acquisition of food
stamps "in any manner not authorized by law" was
unconstitutionally vague. 98 The defendants argued that such a
broad reference failed to reasonably apprise a person of common
understanding exactly what conduct was proscribed. The court
disagreed, holding that taken in context, this reference was
sufficiently definite to give reasonable notice that the reference
94. Kreulhaus v. City of Birmingham, 51 So. 297 (Ala. 1909) (holding
attempted adoption of state misdemeanors void because some misdemeanors
went beyond the power of the city to control).
95. Fla. Citrus Processors Ass'n v. Jesse J. Parrish, Inc., 415 So. 2d 1299
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that an agency rule adopting by reference
citrus content standards of the federal government was limited to existing
standards by the state's non-delegation doctrine); Hillman v. N. Wasco County
People's Util. Dist., 323 P.2d 664, 667 (Or. 1958) (holding unconstitutional a
Public Service Commission order adopting the National Electrical Safety Code
with subsequent changes made by the Federal Department of Commerce). The
interplay between incorporation by reference and the non-delegation doctrine is
discussed in detail infra Part V.
96. Sloss-Sheffield Steel, 57 So. at 29 (finding a municipality had full
authority to utilize reference statutes provided that it otherwise has the power to
legislate as to the subject matter).
97. Though often raised in the same case, the doctrines of vagueness and
unlawful delegation are conceptually distinct. In State v. Welch, 279 So. 2d 11
(Fla. 1973), the Florida Supreme Court reversed a trial court's determination
that a Florida statute incorporating future federal law was unconstitutionally
vague, but went on to find that portions of the statute did constitute an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.
98. 365 So. 2d 157, 158 (Fla. 1978).
1224 [Vol. 68
LOOKING GLASS LA W
was to federal food stamp legislation and implementing regulations
of the United States Department of Agriculture.
9 9
The argument that an incorporation of material is
impermissibly vague often prevails, however. If requirements
imposed by the referenced material are unclear, it is easy to see
that the adopting legislation may have an unacceptable gap or be
too uncertain to apply. First, references may be invalidated
because the material adopted cannot be found. In a few cases, no
law of the sort referenced existed. 00 More often, the references
are too ambiguous or obscure to conclusively identify the material
that has been adopted. 10'
Second, references are sometimes invalidated as being
impermissibly vague because although the intended reference can
be found, the material adopted is so broad that it provides no
meaningful guidance. In Southeast Aluminum v. Metro Dade
99. Id. at 160. See also City of Farmington Hills v. Betrus, 377 N.W.2d
832, 834 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that an adoption in an ordinance of
"Traffic Code" was clearly to the uniform traffic code and thus was clearly
identified).
100. In Savage v. Wallace, 51 So. 605, 607 (Ala. 1910), a statute made
reference to a type of "stock law" that evidently had existed at the time the
reference was made, but which was no longer known. The court concluded the
statute was therefore too vague and indefinite to be applied. Id. The opposite
situation arose in McKee v. City of Geneva, 627 S.E.2d 555 (Ga. 2006), in which
the court found a reference to a document that was not yet in existence but was
to be adopted sometime in the future also too indefinite to be applied. See also
S. Operating Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 159 S.W. 1091 (Tenn. 1913) (finding a
reference in an ordinance to chapter 593 nonexistent and null).
101. See Rollins v. Town of Gordonsville, 215 S.E.2d 637 (Va. 1975)
(invalidating an ordinance because it referred to only the article and title
numbers of the adopted code without a chapter number, where two of the eight
chapters under the title contained an article 6); State v. Doane, 311 N.E.2d 803,
806 (Ind. 1974) (holding that a state statute defining "dangerous drug" to
include "any drug the label of which is required by federal law to bear the
statement: 'Caution: Federal law prohibits dispensing without a prescription'
did not meet the requisite standard of specificity as to which sections of federal
law were sought to be incorporated); People ex rel. Schoon v. Carpentier, 118
N.E.2d 315 (Ill. 1954) (holding a statute adopting part of an unrelated statutory
provision that had to be interpreted by an administrative official, and which
required recourse to business customs, unconstitutionally vague, indefinite and
uncertain); Rutledge v. City of Greenville, 152 S.E. 700 (S.C. 1930) (holding a
reference in a 1901 general law inadequate for not clearly identifying the statute
or statutes intended to be incorporated); Yeo v. Tweedy, 286 P. 970 (N.M. 1929)
(holding that a reference to laws regulating the method and manner of use of
waters of the state might refer to irrigation code or to conflicting artesian water
act).
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County, the county code made it a violation for any contractor to
"[d]isregard or violate any county or Dade County municipal
ordinance or state law pertaining to the contractor's business."'
10 2
The court held this provision unconstitutional on vagueness
grounds, stating that while it was permissible to incorporate other
statutes or ordinances by reference, the statutes or ordinances
incorporated had to be described with some reasonable
particularity. 10 3 Similar incorporations and judicial reactions are
not uncommon. 104  As one commentator has noted, "it would
certainly be dangerous if the legislature could make a reference
large enough to include all possible provisions of the adopted set
of laws, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say which ones
could be rightfully included, and which should be excluded."' 1 5
In other cases, the courts have not invalidated vague adopting
legislation but instead engaged in statutory construction to give it
some effect. While it is difficult to generalize about such
interpretive efforts, a couple of tests can be discerned from the
cases. Some courts have applied a default canon that provisions
will not be held to have been incorporated unless the language of
the referencing legislation indicates such an intention with a
"reasonable degree of certainty."' 1 6 Others have applied the rule
102. 533 So. 2d 777, 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
103. Id. at 778.
104. Kreulhaus v. City of Birmingham, 51 So. 297 (Ala. 1909) (attempted
blanket adoption of all state misdemeanors held void for uncertainty where some
misdemeanors went beyond the power of city to control and it was not clear to
the public what acts were actually prohibited); Hanrahan v. Alterman, 396 A.2d
272, 279 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (law providing that election to be held in
accordance with "the laws of the State of Maryland" not sufficiently specific to
validly incorporate Fair Election Practices Act and its penal provisions). But see
Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Smith, 57 So. 29 (Ala. 1911), a case decided
in Alabama only two years after Kreulhaus, in which the argument that adoption
of the state's misdemeanors was too broad and uncertain was rejected because
the state was the parent of the municipality and knowledge of these laws was
already imputed to those governed by them.
105. Poldervaart, supra note 12, at 721.
106. See, e.g., Bergeson v. Pesch, 117 N.W. 431 (Iowa 1962) (finding no
reasonable degree of certainty as to whether municipal speed limits were
incorporated or not); Hamilton v. City of Louisville, 332 S.W.2d 539 (Ky. 1960)
(finding the required reasonable degree of definiteness absent so adoption of the
standard time fixed for Kentucky by an act of Congress or by order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission could not be given effect); Toronto Pipe Line
Co., Dallas, Tex. v. Camerman Pipelines Co. (In re Toronto Pipe Line Co.,
Dallas, Tex.), 92 N.W.2d 554 (Neb. 1958) (holding it could not be said with a
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that only referenced provisions that are "appropriate to the new
legislation" will be considered to have been adopted.10 7  In any
event, it is easy to see that a given court's identification of the
material that has been referenced might easily deviate from a
careless drafter's original intent.
In addition to vagueness, referential legislation is also subject
to many infirmities that affect other legislation.0 8 In considering
challenges to referential legislation, referenced material should be
considered to be as much a part of the text as if it had been set out
in full within the four corners of the adopting legislation.
Depending on the context, giving effect to this judicial maxim can
invalidate legislation or help it to survive challenge. For example,
reasonable degree of certainty that the legislature intended to make certain
motor carrier licensure provisions applicable to pipe line common carriers);
Road Dist. No. 1 v. Sellers, 180 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. 1944) (finding no reasonable
degree of certainty that a statute incorporating general laws relative to county
bonds was intended to adopt redemption provisions when there were conflicting
provisions); State ex rel. Bancroft v. Frear, 128 N.W. 1068 (Wis. 1910) (finding
no reasonable degree of certainty that legislative intent was for a primary
election statute to incorporate general election law provision allowing a political
party to make to fill a vacancy when the party nominee dies after ballots were
printed); Goodman v. Kendall Gate-Investco., Inc., 395 So. 2d 240 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981) (finding an ordinance adopting the South Florida Building Code
did not also automatically incorporate OSHA safety standards, which had been
in turn incorporated into the South Florida Building Code, because such a
"reference within a reference" was too obscure to clearly indicate intention to
replace common law safety standards);.
107. See, e.g., Peay v. Bd. of Educ., 377 P.2d 490 (Utah 1962) (finding
specific incorporative reference to be a scrivener's error and substituting a
similarly numbered section for the new subject); Adams v. State, 294 N.W. 396
(Neb. 1940) (holding that where a statute is adopted by another statute and
referred to merely by words describing its general character, only those parts of
it which are of a general nature, or which particularly relate to the subject of the
adopting statute, will be considered as incorporated into the adopting statute);
State v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 110 P. 92 (Kan. 1910) (holding that not all of the
provisions of the 1893 statutes were incorporated by the 1909 act, but only those
appropriate to the new subject).
108. The fact that the drafting technique of incorporation by reference is used
does not add to or detract from the validity of the legislation. In Davis v.
Insurance Commissioner & Treasurer, 445 So. 2d 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984), a municipal firefighter applicant challenged a Florida Department of
Insurance rule that adopted minimum vision standards set forth in a ten year old
National Fire Protection Association pamphlet. It was argued that the act of
incorporating such old material was arbitrary and capricious, but the court
correctly focused only on whether the standards themselves were directly related
to the health and safety of firefighters and the public. Id. at 631.
2008] 1227
8LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
where an otherwise valid statute adopted reference material that
was itself found to be unconstitutionally vague, indefinite, and
uncertain, the adopting statute was declared invalid.'0 9 On the
other hand, an ordinance that would have been considered invalid
as vesting unbridled discretion in building officials if considered
without its incorporated building codes was found to be valid when
these additional standards were considered as part of the adopting
legislation. 110
4. Double Jeopardy
The basic understanding that two distinct laws exist after
incorporation-the first in the original legislation that is referenced
and the second in its incarnation as part of the adopting
document-also sheds light on issues relating to double jeopardy.
When incorporation makes a single act a crime under two different
government entities, the question of whether or not successive
prosecutions are barred by the prohibition against double jeopardy
depends upon whether or not the two government entities are
regarded as distinct sovereigns.
When a particular action is made a crime by both a state and
the federal government, the conviction or acquittal by one does not
bar prosecution by the other. This follows from the fact that states
do not derive their sovereignty from the federal government.
States were independent constitutional entities before the federal
government was conceived, surrendering some powers to form the
union through their ratification of the U.S. Constitution, but
109. People ex rel. Schoon v. Carpentier, 118 N.E.2d 315 (Ill. 1954)
(declaring unconstitutional an adopting statute where the referenced statute
made the adopting law so vague, indefinite, and uncertain that men of ordinary
intelligence had to guess its meaning).
110. Thomas v. City of W. Palm Beach, 299 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1974) (finding
valid a city ordinance that delegated to building officials discretion to determine
if a dwelling was "unfit or unsafe" for human habitation or if the costs of repair
exceed fifty percent of the cost of the dwelling after repair, where building codes
were also incorporated to guide the inspectors' discretion). See also State v. All
Pro Paint & Body Shop, Inc., 639 So. 2d 707 (La. 1994) (holding standards
contained in the incorporated Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
sufficient for guidance of the state agency). Cf City of Tucson v. Stewart, 40
P.2d 72 (Ariz. 1935) (holding incorporative references to the National Electrical
Code and the National Electrical Safety Code insufficient to save a vague
ordinance requiring electrical installations to conform to "approved methods").
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retaining residual sovereignty."' The states retain power to
independently determine crimes, and in doing so they are
exercising their own sovereignty, not any delegated sovereignty
from the federal government."2 As a result, "[w]hen a defendant
in a single act violates the 'peace and dignity' of two sovereigns by
breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct
'offences.,"'11 3 It follows that a state criminal statute incorporating
provisions of federal law creates a second distinct offense, and the
conduct denominated a crime by both may be punished by each.
A few incorporation cases involving state and federal authority,
however, have espoused the view that dual offenses are not
involved, only concurrent enforcement of a single offense. In the
Oregon case of State v. Smith, the court declared that the violation
of laws prohibiting the sale of intoxicating beverages constituted a
single offense, enforceable by either the state or the federal
government. 114 Prosecution by one therefore constituted a bar to
trial by the other on the grounds of double jeopardy." 5  The
decision seemed to be based on the wording of the Eighteenth
Amendment, which provided that Congress and the several states
had "concurrent power to enforce" prohibition. 116  Most courts
interpreted the prohibition laws differently, however, finding that
violations of state laws incorporating federal provisions were
violations of distinct (though identical) state offenses. 1"' Thus no
double jeopardy existed.
111. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-19 (1997).
112. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (citing United States v.
Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922)).
113. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (quoting Lanza, 260 U.S. at
382).
114. 199 P. 194 (Or. 1921).
115. See also People v. Sell, 17 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. 1945) (finding a
municipal ordinance did not create new price control regulation but merely
added the city's enforcement sanction to federal law already applicable to
Detroit during the war).
116. This was later explained in State v. Charlesworth, 951 P.2d 153 (Or. Ct.
App. 1997).
117. See, e.g., Cooley v. State, 110 S.E. 449 (Ga. 1922) (holding that under a
dual form of government, violation was an offense against the laws of both the
United States and Georgia and could be punished under both laws without
double jeopardy); Exparte January, 246 S.W. 241 (Mo. 1922) (holding that both
state and federal governments have power to investigate and punish for crimes
involving the sale of intoxicating liquors, and conviction and punishment by the
one, in a particular case, is no bar to the right of the other to punish again upon
122920081
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As for double jeopardy in cases involving local and state
governments, the case of State v. Malone118 is instructive. The
City of Miami had incorporated into a municipal ordinance a state
criminal statute prohibiting operation of a gambling room. The
defendant was tried and acquitted for violation of the ordinance." 9
But, he was then subsequently charged with a violation of the state
statute based on the same set of facts and circumstances that had
led to his prosecution in the municipal court. The District Court
declared that it had long been settled that parallel charges under
municipal and state authority did not violate double jeopardy. 120
Although Malone has not been expressly overturned, proper
application of incorporation by reference doctrine demonstrates
that it should no longer be considered good law. The fact that a
local government has used the technique of incorporation by
reference is irrelevant. As has been shown, the proper
determination is made by considering the result if the referenced
material had in fact been set forth verbatim. That is, by applying
the principle of double jeopardy exactly as if the local government
had created the identical offense without incorporation. At the
time Malone was decided, Florida and many other states had
concluded that conviction by a municipality did not bar trial by the
state, since the state and local governments were separate
sovereigns. 12 1  But the double jeopardy provision in the Fifth
the same facts); Youman v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W. 6 (Ky. 1922) (holding
that the power of the state to punish for possession of an illicit still was not
affected by the fact that the defendant might also be guilty of a similar offense
under federal law); In re Opinion of the Justices, 133 N.E. 453 (Mass. 1921)
(holding that enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment relies upon Congress
and the several states passing distinct laws for a common end).
118. 227 So. 2d 896 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
119. Id.at897.
120. Id.
121. See Earwood v. State, 426 P.2d 151 (Kan. 1967); State v. Amick, 114
N.W.2d 893 (Neb. 1962); State v. Jackson, 291 P.2d 798 (Wyo. 1955); State v.
Simpson, 49 N.W.2d 777 (N.D. 1951); State v. End, 45 N.W.2d 378 (Minn.
1950); State v. Musser, 176 P.2d 199 (Idaho 1946); May v. Town of Carthage, 2
So. 2d 801 (Miss. 1941); Miller v. Hansen, 269 P. 864 (Or. 1928); City of
Milwaukee v. Johnson, 213 N.W. 335 (Wis. 1927); State v. Tucker, 242 P. 363
(Wash.), adhered to on reh'g by 246 P. 758 (Wash. 1926); State v. Garcia, 200
N.W. 201 (Iowa 1924); Webster v. Knewel, 196 N.W. 549 (S.D. 1924); Exparte
Sloan, 217 P. 233 (Nev. 1923); Koch v. State, 41 N.E. 689 (Ohio 1895); State v.
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Amendment is applicable to the states. 122 And the U.S. Supreme
Court determined in Waller v. Florida that for purposes of double
jeopardy, cities and counties are subordinate political divisions of
the state, not separate sovereigns. 123  There may be two distinct
pieces of legislation, but two prosecutions of the same conduct by
different entities of the same sovereign constitutes double
jeopardy. The use of incorporation can in no way alter this result.
Thus prosecution by a local government for violation of an
ordinance adopting a state statute should bar subsequent prosecution
for violation of the referenced statute, notwithstanding Malone.
5. Effect of Subsequent Changes
Perhaps one of the most common difficulties in interpreting
referential legislation occurs when changes have been made to the
referenced material between the time the incorporation takes place
and the time the adopting legislation is actually being applied. It is
easy to see that if the text of the referenced material had literally
been set forth word for word in the adopting legislation, it would
continue to read precisely the way it did when drafted. Any later
changes to the referenced material would not affect it. Thus, the
same result obtains when incorporation by reference is used. 124
One of the earliest cases describing this effect was Van Pelt v.
Hilliard.125 The court stated:
In the construction of such statutes the statute referred to is
treated and considered as if it were incorporated into and
formed part of that which makes the reference. The two
statutes exist as separate, distinct, legislative enactments,
each having its appointed sphere of action, and the
Clifford, 13 So. 281 (La. 1893); McInerney v. City of Denver, 29 P. 516 (Colo.
1892); Pike v. City of Birmingham, 53 So. 2d 394 (Ala. Ct. App. 1951).
122. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
123. 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
124. State v. J.R.M., 388 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 1980) (quoting with approval the
general rule contained in Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 78 So. 693 (Fla. 1918)).
125. 78 So. 693.
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alteration, change or repeal of the one does not operate
upon or affect the other.126
This basic principle127 -that incorporation takes the referenced
material as it exists at the time it is adopted and the adopting
legislation is not affected by the subsequent amendment or repeal
of the referenced material-is widely recognized among the
states.128 This rule has been said to be based upon unassailable
logic 129 and has been routinely applied by courts throughout
common law countries.' However logical it may be, this classic
126. Id. at 698 (emphasis added.)
127. As discussed infra Parts III and IV, the basic principle is often subject to
qualification when there is an express or implied legislative intent in the
adopting legislation that the incorporation is to include subsequent changes.
128. See Bd. of Educ. v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 648 P.2d 1143 (Kan.
1982); County Comm'rs v. Teton County Youth Servs., Inc., 652 P.2d 400
(Wyo. 1982); Med. Ass'n v. Joint City of Atlanta-Fulton County Bd. of Tax
Assessors, 207 S.E.2d 673 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974); Belk v. Bean, 247 So. 2d 821
(Miss. 1971); Powell v. Levy Ct., 236 A.2d 374 (Del. 1967); Gen. Installation
Co. v. Univ. City, 379 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. 1964); Haveman v. Bd. of County Road
Comm'rs, 96 N.W.2d 153 (Mich. 1959); Mogilner v. Metro. Planning Comm'n,
140 N.E.2d 220 (Ind. 1957); Commonwealth ex rel. Keiffer v. Ceraul, 128 A.2d
187 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956); San Diego Co. v. Milotz, 300 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1956);
Dairy & Consumers Coop. Ass'n v. Ariz. Tax Comm'n, 243 P.2d 465 (Ariz.
1952); School Dist. No. I in Arapahoe Co. v. Hastings, 220 P.2d 361 (Colo.
1950); Pac. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Pierce Co., 178 P.2d 351 (Wash.
1947); Adams v. State, 294 N.W. 396 (Neb. 1940); Wagner v. Ret. Bd. of
Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 17 N.E.2d 972 (Ill. 1938); Gustafson v.
Hammond Irrigation Dist. of Rosebud County, 287 P. 640 (Mont. 1930); State
ex rel. Murphy v. HarIlee, 131 So. 866 (Fla. 1930); Harris County Dist.
Attorney's Office v. J.T.S., 296 S.W. 1070 (Tex. 1927); State v. Armstrong, 243
P. 333 (N.M. 1924); Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Barker, 223 P. 529
(Id. 1924); Hutto v. Walker County, 64 So. 313 (Ala. 1913); State v. Caseday,
115 P. 287 (Or. 1911); Stoner v. Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chi. & St. Louis Ry Co.,
20 Ohio Dec. 448 (Ohio Com. P1. 1909); Ct. of Insolvency v. Meldon, 38 A.
167 (Vt. 1897); Collins v. Blake, 9 A. 358 (Me. 1887); Commonwealth v.
Kendall, 11 N.E. 425 (Mass. 1887); In re Main St., 98 N.Y. 454 (N.Y. 1885);
Flanders v. Town of Merrimack, 4 N.W. 741 (Wis. 1880).
129. Read, supra note 4, at 270.
130. See the analysis id. at 281-94, in which Read reviews treatment of the
issue in the four principal common law countries. The classic rule, along with
the so-called "Dexter presumption" discussed infra Part IV, has received
widespread application in American courts. One exception occurred in County
of Seminole v. City of Lake Mary, 347 So. 2d 674, 675 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977), where the district court stated, "Since Section 120.31 has been repealed,
it is a nullity, and any reference to it in another statute that is still effective may
properly be ignored." As noted in Means, supra note 2, at 6, the district court's
statement "could not have been more contrary to the well established doctrines."
Shortly after Florida's fourth district opinion, when the same statute was before
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rule is evidently particularly confusing to many when referenced
legislation is subsequently repealed, rather than simply
amended. 131 In that context, the classic rule was colorfully, though
misleadingly, termed the "Lazarus rule."
In Fisher v. City of Grand Island, a state statute adopted appeal
procedures applicable to justice of the peace courts.' 32  After
adoption, but before the case arose, the referenced justice of the
peace statute was repealed. The majority applied the general rule,
holding that nothing which subsequently happened to the
referenced material, including its repeal, affected the adopting
legislation, which was still effective in its own right. 133 The
dissenting opinion denounced this result, declaring that like the
biblical Lazarus, the repealed law had somehow been miraculously
resurrected by the majority opinion.' 34
Though nicely dramatic, the analogy is fundamentally flawed.
The dissent's characterization fails to reflect that two distinct
manifestations of the adopted material exist.' 35 When the classic
rule is understood, it is quite clear that the referenced material has
in no way been "resurrected," and that it is in fact the "clone"
the Florida Supreme Court in State ex rel. City of Casselberry v. Mager, 356 So.
2d 267, 268 n.3 (Fla. 1978), the court re-emphasized the classic rule, stating,
"The fact that § 120.31 has been repealed, however, does not render its
provisions ineffective for the purposes of § 171.081. We have held that the
repeal of one statute which the Legislature has by reference incorporated into
another will not affect the referencing statute." (citations omitted).
131. See, e.g., Lake Mary, 347 So. 2d 674.
132. 479 N.W.2d 772 (Neb. 1992). See Jeanelle R. Robson, "Lazarus Come
Forth. And He That Was Dead Came Forth." An Examination of the Lazarus
Rule: Fisher v. City of Grand Island, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 221 (1992).
133. Fisher, 479 N.W.2d at 774.
134. Id. (Shanahan, J., dissenting).
135. Among several arguments raised in dissent was a suggestion that the
reference was in fact a general one from which the court could infer the
legislative intent that subsequent changes to the referenced justice of the peace
statute, including its repeal, would be effective as to the incorporating
legislation. Id. at 776. This doctrine is termed the Dexter presumption in this
Article and is discussed infra Part IV. If the dissent was correct that it was a
general reference, the argument is sound. Even then, however, the "Lazarus"
analogy logically fails, for it is always the adopting statute that is being applied,
never the repealed one. The interpretation of the adopting statute is simply
being changed to conform to the presumed intent of the legislature that adopted
it. There is in either case no "resurrection" of a repealed statute, which could
have no application to the case.
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incorporated as part of the adopting legislation (that has never been
repealed) that is being applied.
E. Proposal to Reduce Confusion
It is clear that many of the issues surrounding reference
legislation involve accurate identification of the material
incorporated. The filing and publishing requirements for
referenced material discussed above 136 were created to help resolve
some of these issues. The wide availability of electronic versions
of legislative codes now offers the possibility of electronic filing
and publishing of such materials with additional advantages. First,
publishing filed material on the web would provide much wider
public access. Filing a paper copy of incorporated material in City
Hall or at the department headquarters of an agency with statewide
jurisdiction accurately identifies the referenced material but
provides limited access.' 37 Many more people could read
referenced material if it was filed in electronic form and made
available online. 3 8 The use of hyperlinking technology could also
136. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68.
137. For example, Florida Statutes section 120.55(1)(a)(4) provides that
forms used by a state agency in its dealings with the public shall not be
published in the Florida Administrative Code but instead incorporated by
reference and filed with the Florida Department of State in Tallahassee. This
achieves the intended purpose of clearly identifying exactly which version of the
form is to be used while reducing the size and cost of publishing the Code.
However, it provides extremely limited access to people throughout the state
who may be required to use the form.
138. While no data was found specifically relating to electronic filing of
incorporated materials, the information on expanded public access when codes
themselves are published electronically is persuasive. Prior to the
implementation of the Florida Government Electronic Rulemaking System
(eRules), https://www.flrules.org, a Joint Administrative Procedures Committee
report indicated about 700 subscribers to the printed Florida Administrative
Weekly. JOINT ADMIN. PROCEDURES COMM., FLA. LEG., REPORT ON INTERNET
NOTICING OF THE FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE WEEKLY 3 (2003),
http://japc.state.fl.us/publications.cfm (follow "Report on Internet Noticing-
2003" hyperlink). As of November 30, 2007, statistics available from the
Florida Department of State hosting facility-analyzed by CommerNet, Inc.,
www.commer.net, the eRule application service provider-showed over 3,000
subscribers signed up to receive email notification of the latest rule actions
matching their individual interests, and over 100,000 visits from the general
public to the eRule website each month. While the numbers are not directly
comparable, they do suggest a broad expansion of public access. Since
traditionally filed incorporated materials are much harder to view than the
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provide immediate access directly from the adopting legislation.
Rather than having to lay aside the text of the adopting legislation
to search out a copy of the referenced material, a reader could
simply "click" on the incorporated material, read it, and then
"click" again to return to the adopting legislation.
Second, putting procedures in place to require such hyperlinks
for incorporated material 139 would usefully compel members of the
legislative body to confirm the exact material being incorporated
during the enactment process, not only for the benefit of the voting
members, but for the public and for technical staff that would later
perfect the links. Precise identification of the incorporated
material would frustrate the use of overly broad references, which
have been held unconstitutional on vagueness grounds.
140
Government bodies could continue to utilize incorporative
references in printed compilations of their codes, thus incurring no
additional publishing costs, while linking these references to actual
copies of the filed referenced material in the online versions.
Hyperlink technology already exists in virtually all publishing
formats and the cost for additional server space would be minimal.
One issue that would need to be considered in moving to
electronic filing and publication requirements would be the
treatment of copyrighted materials. 141 As noted earlier,
incorporation of building codes and other technical specifications is
quite common. These materials are often copyrighted, and cases
trying to balance the right of the copyright holder to protect original
works and the right of the public to have full access to the law have
already arisen.142  While the exact parameters of any ultimate
printed codes themselves, it might be supposed that electronic publishing of
incorporated materials would result in an even more dramatic increase in public
access.
139. Since December 31, 2007, Florida Statutes section 120.55(2)(d) has
required that the Florida Administrative Weekly Internet website allow users to
view forms that are being incorporated by reference in state agency rules.
140. See supra Part II.D.3.
141. Senate Bill 704 of Florida's 2008 Regular Session provides for
electronic publication of materials incorporated by reference in state agency
rules, but exempts copyrighted materials. The bill passed both houses of the
Florida Legislature, but has not yet been signed by the Governor.
142. Compare Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th
Cir. 2002) (holding website publication of a city law adopting a building code
did not infringe the copyright of the organization that authored model code),
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compromise between these competing rights are not yet clear, new
technologies may also be involved in implementing that balance.
III. THE AMERICAN CONVENTION
I can explain all the poems that ever were invented-and a
good many that haven't been inventedjust yet. 143
In McKnight v. Crinnion,144 a case not unlike the Grand Island
case discussed earlier, 145 an 1849 Missouri act provided that
actions for the recovery of personal property should be adjudicated
by justices of the peace using procedures set forth in an 1845
practice act governing circuit courts. 146 The 1849 act took effect
slightly before a revision of the referenced 1845 act. The issue to
be decided was whether the justices of thepeace were to follow the
old or new circuit court procedures. 147  The Crinnion court
declined to follow the classic rule, stating:
It was not designed that the rule in the justices' courts
should be different from that in the Circuit Court, but that
as often as the rule was changed for the Circuit Courts, the
justices should be governed by it. 148
Thus the court concluded that the legislative intent was that the
procedures for justices should conform to those of the circuit
courts as they were changed from time to time. 149 This result was
certainly within the power of the Missouri legislature. It made
with Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding the AMA did not lose its copyright in a system of medical
procedure classification codes when the federal government required Medicaid
and Medicare filers to use the codes). For detailed discussions of the complex
issues involved, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public
Law: Copyright, Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REv.
291 (2005), and Katie M. Colendich, Who Owns "The Law"? The Effect on
Copyrights when Privately-Authored Works Are Adopted or Enacted by
Reference into Law, 78 WASH. L. REV. 589 (2003).
143. CARROLL, supra note 1, at 189 (Humpty Dumpty).
144. 22 Mo. 559 (Mo. 1856)
145. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
146. Crinnion, 22 Mo. at 559.
147. Id.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. Id.
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sense. But legislative use of a reference statute to achieve such a
purpose would have been completely incongruous. The classic
rule unavoidably freezes the referenced text as of the moment of its
adoption, while the intention of the legislature (at least as
determined by the court) was to achieve precisely the opposite
result. The classic interpretive maxim that referential legislation
should be read as if the referenced material was set forth verbatim
in the adopting statute was turned inside out.
If Crinnion was the first crack in the structure of classic
incorporation doctrine, it was not the last. As described by one
scholar:
[D]espite their initial declaration of firm loyalty to a rule
coined of logic and dedicated to certainty, it was not long
before the "American" courts, while in the throes of
construction, resorted to the "Intention of the Legislature,"
that Aladdin's lamp which has so often enabled Anglo-
American courts to conjure much from little or nothing. 150
Thus, as other legislatures and other courts similarly tried to
effect pragmatic ends in the face of the logical but inflexible
dictates of basic incorporation doctrine, the doctrine was gradually
expanded. In short, the phrase "unless a contrary intent appears"
was essentially engrafted onto the classic rule. 15 1 In consequence,
150. Read, supra note 4, at 271.
151. Poldervaart, supra note 12, at 729. See also Haw. Providers Network,
Inc. v. AIG Haw. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 233 (Haw. 2004); In re Commitment of
Edward, 570 A.2d 917 (N.J. 1990); Roddy Mfg. Co. v. Olsen, 661 S.W.2d 868
(Tenn. 1983); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Teton County Youth Servs., Inc., 652
P.2d 400 (Wyo. 1982); Sch. Dist. No. 17, Douglas County v. State, 316 N.W.2d
767 (Neb. 1982); City of Warrensburg v. Bd. of Regents of Cent. Mo. State
Univ., 562 S.W.2d 340 (Mo. 1978); Mach. Co. v. Yavapai County, 491 P.2d
1132 (Ariz. 1972); Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1969); People v.
Reese, 109 N.W.2d 868 (Mich. 1961); Romanov v. Dental Comm'n, 111 A.2d 9
(Conn. 1955); Ex parte McMahan, 237 P.2d 462 (Okla. Crim. App. 1951);
Egbert v. City of Dunseith, 24 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1946); McLeod v.
Commercial Nat'l Bank, 178 S.W.2d 496 (Ark. 1944); O'Flynn v. E. Rochester,
54 N.E.2d 343 (N.Y. 1944); Noble v. Noble, 103 P.2d 293 (Or. 1940); Gilson
Bros. Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., 265 N.W. 217 (Wis. 1936); Trimmier v.
Carlton, 296 S.W. 1070 (Tex. 1927); Perkins v. Winslow, 133 A. 235 (Del.
1926); Delahoussaye v. Bd. of Trustees, 103 So. 152 (La. 1925); Luzader v.
Sargeant, 30 P. 142 (Wash. 1892); In re Kugler, 55 Pa. 123 (Pa. 1867); Turney
v. Wilton, 36 I11. 385 (11. 1865); Spring Valley Water Works v. City of San
Francisco, 22 Cal. 434 (Cal. 1863); Ind. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n v. Baker,
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as shall be seen, legislative bodies and courts were forced to
grapple with additional issues.
IV. THE DEXTER PRESUMPTION
My dear! I really must get a thinner pencil I can't
manage this one a bit, it writes all manner of things that I
don't intend.... 152
A. General and Specific References
The "American convention" may be quite useful in those
instances in which the intent of a legislative body is clearly stated,
but it has a significant limitation: it is often difficult to find any
indication of intent. The courts therefore quickly developed a
presumption to aid in determining whether a legislative reference
was intended to refer to material only as it existed at the time the
adopting legislation became effective or rather was intended to
refer to the material as it might change from time to time after the
reference had been made.
The case of Jones v. Dexter involved a statute providing that
personal property should be distributed according to the "law
regulating descents."' 53 The court reasoned that the general nature
of this language-making no reference to any particular act, by its
title or otherwise--Indicated that it was the legislative intent that
the 1828 statute remain consistent with the law of descents as it
might change over time.1 54 Therefore, rather than interpret the
applicable law to be that contained in the statute governing
descents of realty that had been in effect when the reference was
made, the court instead applied a later statute that had superseded
the adopted law. Other early cases soon applied similar
presumptions of legislative intent.
286 N.E.2d 174 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972); Davis v. City of Macon, 178 S.E.2d 557
(Ga. Ct. App. 1970).
152. CARROLL, supra note 1, at 136 (The White King).
153. 8 Fla. 276, 278 (Fla. 1859).
154. Id. at 285.
155. Culver v. People, 43 N.E. 812 (Ill. 1896) (holding a reference that refers
to general law regulating the subject in hand will be regarded as including the
1238 [Vol. 68
LOOKING GLASS LA W
On first consideration, the logic of these early cases seems
reasonable enough. When legislation adopts specific provisions, it
seems likely that its drafters must have known the exact wording
of the provisions they wanted, and there is no reason to assume
that unknown future amendments would also be deemed
appropriate. On the other hand, when reference is made only to the
law generally, it seems the intention might be to link the adopting
statute to an entire body of law, not to any particular provision of
it; so any changes to that body of law from time to time should be
adopted as well.' 56  This reasoning was combined with classic
incorporation doctrine and crystallized into a general rule of
construction:
Where one statute adopts the whole or a part of another
statute by a particular or descriptive reference to the statute
or provisions adopted, such adoption takes the statute as it
exists at the time of adoption and does not include
subsequent additions, modifications, or repeals of the
statute so taken unless it does so expressly or by necessary
implication. But where the reference is not to any
particular statute or part of a statute, but to the law
generally which governs a specified subject, the reference
will be regarded as including, not only the law on that
subject in force at the date of the referential act, but also
that law as it exists from time to time thereafter.
15 7
law in force when action is taken); Cole v. Donovan, 64 N.W. 741 (Mich. 1895)
(finding a general reference to another law is intended to furnish a rule for future
conduct and the law existing at the time when the rule is invoked should be
consulted); Gaston v. Lamkin, 21 S.W. 1100 (Mo. 1893) (holding a general
reference to established law is implemented by consulting the law governing
such cases at the time the rule is invoked); Newman v. City of N. Yakima, 34 P.
921 (Wash. 1893) (holding that a statement that certain things should be done in
accordance with existing law, without a specific reference, refers to the law in
force at the time of application); Kirk v. Rhoads, 46 Cal. 398 (Cal. 1873)
(holding that a statute providing only that the law "in force" was to be applied,
without more specific reference, meant the law was in force at the time the case
arose).
156. See In re Edward S., 570 A.2d 917, 925 (N.J. 1990).
157. Read, supra note 4, at 271-72 (footnotes, emphasis omitted).
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This formulation was widely accepted in the states.' 58  It
completed the expansion of a drafting technique originally
designed to prevent only unnecessary repetition into a mechanism
to also indicate how future changes in law are to be interpreted.
While it cannot be doubted that judicial presumptions are often
quite useful in bringing needed certainty to the law, the Dexter
presumption itself was destined to foster only more confusion.
B. Presumption and Express Intent
The brief history of the Dexter presumption recounted here
should have demonstrated that it was developed as a rule of
construction to be applied when inferring legislative intent in the
absence of an express indication. Most cases seem to apply it in
that fashion, 159 but some cases have ignored express statutory
language concerning the intended scope of the incorporation and
arrived at a contrary result by relying on the Dexter presumption.
In Palm Beach County National Utility Company, Inc. v. Palm
Beach County Health Department, the court determined that a
county ordinance adopting a state agency rule did so through a
general reference. 160  But any resulting presumption that the
legislative intent was for the ordinance to reflect changes in the
referenced state rules as they occurred from time to time should
have easily been overcome by the express language in the
158. In re Edward S., 570 A.2d 917; Layton Sch. of Art & Design v. Wis.
Employment Relations Comm'n, 262 N.W.2d 218 (Wis. 1978); Carruba v.
Meeks, 150 So. 2d 195 (Ala. 1963); State v. Dist. Ct., 114 N.W.2d 317 (Iowa
1962); State ex rel. Anderson v. Duffy, 185 N.E.2d 435 (Ohio 1962); Byrd v.
Short, 307 S.W.2d 871 (Ark. 1958); State ex rel. Walsh v. Buckingham, 80 P.2d
910 (Nev. 1938); In re Easby, 192 A. 646 (Pa. 1937); In re Heiman's Will, 2
P.2d 982 (N.M. 1931); Dabney v. Hooker, 249 P. 381 (Okla. 1926); Nampa &
Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Barker, 223 P. 529 (Idaho 1924); Lyman v. Ramey,
242 S.W. 21 (Ky. 1922); State v. Ganong, 184 P. 233 (Or. 1919); State v. Leich,
78 N.E. 189 (Ind. 1906); Culver, 43 N.E. 812; Cole, 64 N.W. 741; Gaston, 21
S.W. 1100; Newman, 34 P. 921; Kirk, 46 Cal. 398; Arrington v. Arrington, 618
P.2d 744 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980); Campbell v. Hunt, 155 S.E.2d 682 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1967); State ex rel. Springer v. Smith, 189 So. 2d 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1966).
159. See In re Edward S., 570 A.2d 917; Roddy Mfg. Co. v. Olsen, 661
S.W.2d 868 (Tenn. 1983); Union Cemetery v. City of Milwaukee, 108 N.W.2d
180 (Wis. 1961); Egbert v. City of Dunseith, 24 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1946);
Trimmier v. Carlton, 296 S.W. 1070 (Tex. 1927).
160. 390 So. 2d 115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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reference itself. The incorporation was explicitly limited to those
rules "to date adopted" by the state department. 16 1 The
incorporation was also explicitly stated to have "the same effect as
if the provisions of each ... rule had been set out in full.' 62 It is
impossible to understand how the court could have reached the
conclusions it did if the provisions had in fact been set out in full
in the ordinance.
Cases such as Palm Beach County have applied the Dexter
presumption to achieve a result contrary to explicit expressions of
intent by the adopting legislative body. In doing so, they subvert
the legitimate purpose of the Dexter presumption as a rule of
construction applicable only when there is no more compelling
evidence of intent upon which to rely. 16
3
C. Interpretive Complications
The Dexter presumption is not easy to apply. In theory the
distinction between specific and general references sounds clear
enough, but in practice references are often difficult to
categorize.164 In the Palm Beach County case discussed above,
165
for example, the referenced material was described as the rules
adopted pursuant to Florida Statutes chapter 381. Note that while a
specific statute was referenced by number, it was not primarily the
statute that was being incorporated, but rather the administrative
rules developed under the authority which that statute conferred.
In the absence of any express intent in such a double reference,
should subsequent changes to the rules also be considered as
adopted? What if the statute itself were subsequently amended or
161. Id. at 116.
162. Id. (emphasis omitted).
163. When both the adopting and referenced statute are promulgated by the
same legislative body, express intent might also appear in the legislation
modifying or repealing the adopted statute. Simmons v. State, 280 A.2d 351
(Conn. 1971). The legislative intent of the entity later amending the referenced
statute would supersede even an earlier contrary intent expressed in the adopting
legislation.
164. Several commentators have noted this difficulty. See Means, supra note
2, at 11; Read, supra note 4, at 274; R. Perry Sentell, Jr., "Reference
Statutes "-Borrow Now and Pay Later?, 10 GA. L. REv. 153, 156 (1975).
165. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
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repealed? Should the reference be considered a general one as to
the administrative rules' 66 but a specific one as to the statute?
Or consider the nature of the references discussed in State ex
rel. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. Industrial Commission:
In the instant case the adopting statute, Section 1465-68b,
refers to practically the entire body of the Workmen's
Compensation Law from Section 1465-44 to Section 1465-
108, General Code, excepting only Section 1465-90. There
is no specific reference to any one section or part of any
one statute. It would seem, therefore, that Section 1465-
68b, General Code, was intended to apply to the
Workmen's Compensation Law generally from Section
1465-44 to Section 1465-108, General Code, wherever
applicable, not only as they existed and in form were
effective in 1921 but as later amended and in form effective
at the time the situation or facts arise to which the law is to
be applied. 1
67
Despite the fact that the reference was made to a specific series of
statutes by number, with the express omission of one section, the
court nevertheless concluded the reference was a general one.
Examples abound. Compare In re Heath, in which language
providing that appeals were to be conducted "in like manner as
provided by law in reference to the final judgments, orders, and
decrees of the circuit courts" was held to be a specific reference,1
68
with Davison v. Heinrich, in which language providing that
appeals were to be conducted in like "manner as appeals may be
taken from justices of the peace" was held to be a general
reference. 169 Compare Newman v. City of North Yakima, in which
a reference to the "general law now in force" was construed to
mean the law in force at the time the tax was levied instead of the
law in force at the time of adoption, 170 with Tillamook City v.
County Court, in which a reference to a road tax equal to that "now
166. Since, in Palm Beach County, the county itself was not in control of the
rules promulgated by the state agency, would the county even have authority to
adopt future changes? See infra Part V on delegation.
167. 24 N.E.2d 448,450-51 (Ohio 1939).
168. 144 U.S. 92 (1892).
169. 172 N.E. 770 (Ill. 1930).
170. 34 P. 921 (Wash. 1893).
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levied by law" was construed to mean the law in force at the time
of adoption instead of the law at the time the tax was levied.
171
Compare the suggestion by Brabner-Smith that a reference to an
act by popular name also adopts subsequent changes, 172 with the
suggestion by Read that a reference to an act by popular name does
not adopt subsequent changes' 73 (though both acknowledge the
difficulty of applying the Dexter presumption). 174
Further examples could be cited, 175 but the lesson for a
legislative drafter is that the distinction between specific and
general references created by the Dexter presumption provides
courts with a generous flexibility. If there is in fact a true
legislative intent as to the adoption of future changes, it is essential
to state that intent in certain terms.
It is probably not by chance that most creative judicial
interpretations construe what might appear to be a specific
reference to be in fact a general one, and not the other way around.
As Means suggests, "there are many instances-a vast majority of
them, in [Means'] opinion-in which the legislature simply could
not have intended the outcome that would be inferable on the basis
of the common law principles."' 176 He goes on to describe several
categories of specific references for which he suggests the actual
expectation of legislators and the public alike is that any future
changes to the referenced material will in fact be adopted, which is
of course directly contrary to the Dexter presumption. 177 It may
well be a similar conviction in judges that causes them to
sometimes struggle against the result their own canon of
construction suggests.
7
The most important category identified by Means, and the only
one to be discussed here, includes references to provisions created
171. 107 P. 482 (Or. 1910).
172. Brabner-Smith, supra note 12, at 204.
173. Read, supra note 4, at 274.
174. Brabner-Smith, supra note 12, at 204; Read, supra note 4, at 274.
175. See, e.g., Means, supra note 2, at 10-12.
176. Means, supra note 2, at 19.
177. Id. at 19-25. He identifies reciprocal cross-references, references
having a negative implication, references for directory purposes, and references
to provisions within the same statutory scheme. Id.
178. See, e.g., Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assoc., Inc., 978 F.2d 978 (7th
Cir. 1992) (noting the maze of cross-references in the ERISA statute and
concluding that adoption without future changes would be "bizarre").
2008) 1243
4LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
as part of the same statutory scheme. These references likely
constitute a very high percentage of all incorporative references
and include references within a body of law dealing with a given
subject matter to other sections within that same body of law, as
well as references to common penalty or procedure statutes that are
applicable across many subject areas. 179
An example of a common procedure statute in Florida is the
Administrative Procedure Act, which governs the quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial actions of most executive branch agencies.
There are at least two thousand references within the Florida
Statutes to chapter 120 and its various subsections.' 8 0 While these
references are clearly all specific ones, the intention of the
legislature' 8 1 and the expectation of most readers is undoubtedly
that these references refer to the APA or its provisions as they
appear at the time the adopting statute is being read or applied, not
at the time the references were initially made. Since the
Administrative Procedure Act is amended frequently,'82 any other
interpretation would be chaotic, with different agencies being
required to follow different procedures depending on when their
particular reference to the Act was made.
Crimes and penalty provisions are also often linked as part of a
common statutory scheme. In Florida, penalty provisions for
various categories of felonies and misdemeanors are set forth in
one section of the statutes, while a description of prohibited
conduct can appear almost anywhere, with a cross-reference back
to these penalty provisions. Again, the intention of the legislature
179. Means, supra note 2, at 21-25.
180. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.50-.81 (2007). This figure is based upon an
electronic search of the individual section numbers contained within chapter
120. See The Florida Senate, The 2007 Florida Statutes, Title X, Chapter 120,
http://www.flsenate.gov/Statutes/ (select "Title X," then follow "Chapter 120"
hyperlink).
181. This legislative intent is clear because section 120.72 provides,
Unless expressly provided otherwise, a reference in any section of the
Florida Statutes to chapter 120 or to any section or sections or portion
of a section of chapter 120 includes, and shall be understood as
including, all subsequent amendments to chapter 120 or to the
referenced section or sections or portion of a section.
There are a few similar statutory construction provisions in the Florida Statutes,
but they cover only a small portion of cross-references.
182. Florida's Administrative Procedure Act has been amended every year
since it was first adopted in 1974.
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is that any change in the referenced penalty for a felony of the third
degree, for example, would apply regardless of whether the
reference appeared before or after the amendment to the penalty.1 83
Other criminal provisions reference each other as well. Consider
the recent amendment of the Florida Statutes relating to assault
upon a law enforcement officer that had been previously
referenced in a separate statute relating to juvenile justice. When
the assault statute was amended, provisions of the juvenile justice
statute referencing that offense were reenacted in full for purposes
of updating the reference under the incorporation doctrine.
184
A few cases have gone so far as to engraft "common enactment
variations" onto the Dexter presumption. These are usually
intended to address specific references to related provisions that
are part of the same statutory scheme. I8 5 These variations allow
specific references to adopt future changes to other statutes enacted
at the same time. Perhaps the best analysis appeared in American
Bank v. Goss:
We shall assume that the general rule is as claimed by the
respondent and that ordinarily an independent statute
absorbing or incorporating by proper reference the
provisions of another and independent statute would not be
affected by amendments made to the latter after the
incorporation. On the other hand, we think it must be
183. See FLA. STAT. § 775.082(10) (2007) ("The purpose of this section is to
provide uniform punishment for those crimes made punishable under this
section and, to this end, a reference to this section constitutes a general reference
under the doctrine of incorporation by reference."). The legislative intent
behind this language is clear. It is curious that the statute attempts to effect this
end indirectly by stating that any reference is a general reference, so that
application of the common law Dexter presumption will then arrive at the
intended result rather than directly stating the legislative intent. This indirect
approach may be contrived to avoid those cases in which an express intent is not
followed if contrary to the Dexter presumption, criticized here at supra notes
160-63.
184. 2007 Florida Laws, section 7, chapter 2007-112, provides, "For the
purpose of incorporating the amendment made by this act to section 784.07,
Florida Statutes, in a reference thereto, paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section
985.11, Florida Statutes, is reenacted to read: .. ." before setting out the statute
in full as it read before the bill was passed. This undoubtedly addresses the
technical legal problem but does not provide much public notice. Such language
explaining the purpose of the reenactment is not codified, and only a very
careful researcher would become aware of it.
185. Poldervaart, supra note 12, at 731.
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equally clear that if one section or provision of a statute
adopts and incorporates by reference the provisions of
another section or subdivision of the same statute, a
subsequent amendment of the latter will be regarded as
affecting the entire statute including the subdivision which
made the adoption. In such a case the entire statute will be
regarded as reenacted at the time of the last amendment,
and all of its provisions will be affected by the latter. 18
6
But common enactment variations have not been widely adopted,
and many cases have applied the Dexter presumption despite a
very close relationship between the adopting and referenced
statutes. 
87
In Florida, however, a confusing attempt was made to apply a
common enactment variation applicable not to specific, but rather
to general references. In Williams v. State ex rel. Newberger, the
court painstakingly concluded that notwithstanding the general
reference involved, since both the adopting and the referenced
provisions had been re-enacted together as part of the same bulk
revision in 1920, the adopting provision took the changes made as
part of the common update in 1920, but not subsequently.' 8
8
This case therefore made a class of general references that
would have otherwise been considered to automatically adopt
future changes not do so unless the statutes were enacted together
as part of a bulk revision. The dissent would have relied upon the
Dexter presumption and construed the adopting provision to have
also been updated along with amendments to the referenced
provisions enacted after 1920.189
186. 142 N.E. 156, 157 (N.Y. 1923)
187. See, e.g., Calumet Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Mroz, 137 N.E. 627 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1922) (holding that even when one section is made a part of another
section of the same act by specific reference, such adoption takes the statute as it
exists at the time of adoption and does not include subsequent additions or
modifications of the statute); Flanders v. Town of Merrimack, 4 N.W. 741 (Wis.
1880) (holding that where section 1210b referred to "the causes mentioned in
1210a" and 1210a was subsequently repealed, the specific reference was to be
understood as enumerating the causes, thus applying the Dexter presumption
without the common enactment variation).
188. 131 So. 864 (Fla. 1930). State ex reL Murphy v. Harlee, 131 So. 866
(Fla. 1930), handed down the same day, was decided under the same analysis.
189. For a detailed critique of these cases, see Means, supra note 2, at 12-17.
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This unusual Florida "common enactment" case has not been
overruled (though it has seldom been cited), 90 but it seems
unlikely that it would be decided in the same way today. In State
v. Camil, the Florida Supreme Court expressly rejected the
argument that the biennial (now annual) General Reenactment
Statute' 91 automatically results in an update of all laws
incorporated by reference in the Florida Statutes. 192  The court
concluded that such biennial revisions lack the requisite initial title
notice to allow them to effect such substantive changes in existing
law. 19 3  While the incorporation in Camil was an adoption of
federal law, the reasoning of the case would apply equally to
incorporations of state law. With respect to this issue, the bulk
revision involved in the Williams case seems no different from the
annual revisions that take place today. Since Florida cases have
applied the Dexter presumption to find general references
ambulatory after Camil, it might be concluded that Williams is no
longer good authority.
D. Cross-reference Construction Provisions
The apparent judicial discomfort' 94 with the results that the
Dexter presumption engendered for provisions within the same
statutory scheme was evidently shared by several state
legislatures. 195 At least thirteen states 196 have enacted reference
190. Florida's "common enactment" variation has not been applied in any
case since the two original cases, but was discussed in Reino v. State, 352 So. 2d
853, 859 (Fla. 1977). Means, supra note 2, at 17-18, noted that the doctrine of
incorporation was probably not applicable to the Reino case at all, and would
have been of no help to the party arguing for its application if it had been.
191. The General Reenactment Statute is prepared each year pursuant to
Florida Statutes section 11.2421.
192. 279 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1973).
193. Id. at 834 ("We believe that it would be improper to arbitrarily permit a
substantive inclusion by reference.").
194. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
195. The speculation on the origins of Louisiana's cross-reference
construction statute, offered in In re Joyce May Black, 225 B.R. 610 (Bankr.
M.D. La. 1998), may well reflect the actual intent of states in enacting
construction legislation that has the effect of reversing certain elements of the
Dexter presumption.
196. In California, each of several California codes has its own reference
construction provision, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 9 (West 2007). Together,
these provide comprehensive coverage. Other states have enacted a single
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construction statutes that attempt to reverse the judicial
presumption of legislative intent inferred for various categories of
references. All of these statutes provide that under certain
circumstances, when a state statute specifically references another
state statute, the adopting statute also adopts future changes to that
referenced material. None provide that when a state statute
references the law generally, it adopts it only as it exists at the time
of adoption, without future changes. These statutes thus do not
reverse the Dexter presumption that the intent of a general
reference is to adopt future changes, but instead actually extend the
presumption to cover many specific references as well.
In fact, in eight of the thirteen states,' 97 the construction
statutes are not even worded as presumptions but on their face
simply direct the result. A North Dakota statute, a typical
provision, thus provides, "A reference to any portion of a statute
applies to all reenactments, revisions, or amendments thereof."' 198
In the other five states, a phrase similar to "unless a contrary intent
is expressed" is included. 99 Considering the fact that it was the
inflexibility of the Dexter presumption that evidently caused these
states to attempt to partially overturn it with legislation in the first
place, it is interesting that the first eight states do not sanction the
courts to consider contrary intent or other factors. In any event, it
seems doubtful that courts would conclude that they retain no
discretion in the face of these statutes.
provision with application throughout the state's statutes, and sometimes
beyond. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 2-4-209 (2007), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1, §
307(b) (2007), HAW. REV. STAT. § 1-25 (2007), IOWA CODE § 4.3 (2007), LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 1:14 (2007), MINN. STAT. § 645.31(2) (2007), N.D. CENT.
CODE § 1-02-40 (2007), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.55 (WEST 2007), OR. REV.
STAT. § 174.060 (2007), 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1937 (2007), R.I. GEN. LAWS § 43-
4-13 (2007), Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 8-1-103(a)(iii) (2007). Other states, including
Florida, have enacted construction statutes applicable only to a very limited
range of statutes. Sam McKeen, Constitutionality of City Ordinances Which
Adopt State Statutes by Reference, 37 OR. L. REV. 272, 274 (1958) offers some
interesting thoughts on the effect of extending Oregon's construction statute to
municipal ordinances.
197. California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Louisiana, North Dakota,
Ohio, and Rhode Island.
198. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 1- 02-40 (2007).
199. Iowa, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Wyoming. See, e.g., IOWA
CODE § 4.3 (2007).
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Another interesting way to view these construction statutes is
from the perspective of their scope. While most of the states
200
seem to provide that the construction statute governs references to
the statutes and other domestic law of the referencing state,
20 1
Delaware, Louisiana, and Minnesota provide that the construction
202
statute applies to references to another statute or any other law.
It is not clear whether these statutes were intended, or have been
interpreted, to do so, but it is within the authority of a legislative
body to state its intention to adopt future changes to referenced
legislation that has been promulgated by an external government
entity.20
3
Before moving on to consider effects of the non-delegation
doctrine, it should be noted here that careful use of the Internet in
publishing codes 2 04 could greatly complement cross-reference
construction statutes in clarifying legislative intent. Incorporations
intended (or required) 20 5 to adopt material only as it exists on the
date of initial reference could be hyperlinked to an exact copy of
the original material.20 6 This copy of the material would then be
200. California, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wyoming.
201. In State v. Charlesworth, 951 P.2d 153 (Or. Ct. App. 1997), it was noted
that the Oregon construction statute did not apply to interpretation of statutes
that refer to non-Oregon law. See also State v. Dist. Ct., 114 N.W.2d 317 (Iowa
1962) (finding that a construction statute providing that any statute which adopts
by reference a whole or portion of another statute shall be construed to include
subsequent amendments has no relevance to an adopting statute that adopts
general law).
202. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 307(b) (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1:14
(2007); MINN. STAT. § 645.31(2) (2007).
203. In many states, of course, an attempt to adopt material to be
promulgated in the future by another governmental or private entity constitutes a
violation of the non-delegation doctrine. See infra Part V.
204. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
205. Florida's Administrative Procedure Act, for example, only authorizes
the incorporation of material as it exists on the date the adopting rule becomes
effective. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(i)(1) (2007)
206. Material incorporated by Florida state agencies in their rules is currently
filed in hard copy with the Department of State in conjunction with the rule
adopting it. It is maintained by that office to provide the official record of
exactly what was incorporated and to prevent subsequent changes to the
incorporated material from being construed as being part of the rule without new
rulemaking. § 120.54(1)(i)(1). Filing of such materials in electronic form
would generally be less cumbersome.
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207separately maintained by the legislating body, preventing any
amendments or repeal of the original material that was referenced
from being construed as somehow also affecting the incorporated
version. This electronic safeguard would involve only additional
server space and minimal cost, because printed versions would still
contain only the primary legislation and not the referenced
material.
The basic legal conceptualization that referenced material takes
on a unique incarnation unaffected by subsequent amendment or
repeal of the original material20 8 could thus be effectively realized
through use of the hyperlink technology, greatly reducing
confusion for readers unfamiliar with this sometimes arcane
doctrine. If, on the other hand, the legislative intent was to
reference incorporated material as it may be subsequently changed,
the hyperlink could be made to an external document maintained
by the entity promulgating the referenced material20 9 or, in the case
of cross-references, to subsequent versions as they take effect from
time to time.2'0  Reference construction statutes are not always
consulted, and the careful implementation of a complementary
system of hyperlinked documents could essentially match the usual
reader's experience to actual legislative intent.21 1 Procedures that
required either fixed or ambulatory hyperlinks to be made to
207. Fixed references should not be linked to external websites or material
outside the control of the legislating body, because these sources obviously are
likely to change over time.
208. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
209. Such external links would be less reliable than internal links, subject as
they would be to actions of those outside the control of the legislating body, but
no more so than most material on the Internet. It should also be noted that in
many states there is a great likelihood that an attempted adoption of materials to
be promulgated by an external entity sometime in the future will be declared
unconstitutional. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
210. The electronic version of the Florida Statutes maintained by the Florida
Legislature at http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes contains such ambulatory cross-
reference links. Within each annual compilation of the Florida Statutes, the
cross-references to other portions of the statutes are underlined and hyperlinked
to the latest version of the referenced statute. As discussed supra in notes 177-
84 and accompanying text, these links are to the text that in most cases is
consistent with both legislative intent and with reader expectations, but most
often not to the text that the "Dexter presumption" of prevailing judicial
interpretation would conclude was operative.
211. Naturally, administrative and technical errors would still occasionally
occur, and the careful lawyer would still have to research, but the system would
be far superior to the existing regime in most states.
1250 [Vol. 68
LOOKING GLASS LA W
incorporated material would also require legislators to address the
usually unconsidered question of the effect of subsequent changes
to the referenced material, confirming the intent of the entire
legislative body at the time of enactment.
Traditionally, filing requirements for incorporated material
have been addressed primarily to local governments and state
agencies. 212 The benefits of electronic filing suggested here might
also be considered by state legislatures and the Congress.
V. THE DELEGATION CONSTRAINT
Oh, what fun it'll be, when they see me through the glass in
here, and can't get at me.
2 13
A. Non-delegation Doctrine
The distribution of power is one of the most fundamental issues
in any social organization. In our political history, the primary
divisions of governmental power at both the federal and state level
have been constitutionally prescribed 214 and not left to legislative
assignment, 215 so that the allocation could not be altered except
through the cumbersome process of constitutional amendment.2 6
Logically, reallocation of this power by any means other than
constitutional amendment would be prohibited. It was simply
212. Etter, supra note 73, at 246.
213. CARROLL, supra note 1, at 132 (Alice).
214. Thirty-four of the fifty state constitutions have strict separation of
powers clauses that contain language prohibiting one branch from exercising the
powers of the others; six states have specific separation of powers clauses that
divide the powers of government into three branches; the remaining ten states
and the federal government have no explicit separation of powers clause at all,
the doctrine being implied from the overall allocation of power. See Scott Boyd,
Legislative Checks on Rulemaking Under Florida's New APA, 24 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 309, 327-28 (1997) (referencing specific constitutional provisions of each
state in the context of a discussion of cases relating to the legislative veto).
215. In support of a similar allocation in the proposed Constitution of the
United States, Madison cites in Federalist Paper No. 48 the separation of power
provisions of the constitutions of Virginia and Pennsylvania and explains the
necessity of such separation to prevent the legislative department from
controlling all of the powers of government. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James
Madison).
216. Madison notes in Federalist Paper No. 43 that the amendment process
would guard "against that extreme facility which would render the Constitution
too mutable." THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).
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stated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Shreveport Grain
& Elevator Co.: "That the legislative power of Congress cannot be
delegated is, of course, clear."
217
Though the proposition that only a legislature has the power to
legislate may be unequivocal, the practical problems of governance
have led to a more nuanced approach:
But while the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is
unquestionably a fundamental element of our constitutional
system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the
courts. Once it is conceded, as it must be, that no statute
can be entirely precise, and that some judgments, even
some judgments involving policy considerations, must be
left to the officers executing the law and to the judges
applying it, the debate over unconstitutional delegation
becomes a debate not over a point of principle but over a
question of degree.2
18
As might be expected, the judicial decisions of the several
states similarly reflect different views as to the point at which
inevitable delegations go too far and become unconstitutional
abdications. Despite the yearning for consistency, this is as it
should be. The legislative power that cannot be delegated might be
the power of a local government, or a state legislature, or the
Congress, and the policy considerations and constitutional or
charter provisions that shape the considerations of the appropriate
court are not identical in every situation.219  Despite this,
examination of the interaction between non-delegation and
217. 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932).
218. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring that no unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority existed,
but dissenting on other grounds).
219. It is article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution that prohibits the
Florida legislature from delegating the power to legislate to others.
D'Alemberte v. Anderson, 349 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1977). See also Anderson v.
Tiemann, 155 N.W.2d 322, 326 (Neb. 1967) (reaffirming an earlier decision that
the state could not generally delegate to the federal government, but holding
otherwise on the facts before it because the Nebraska Constitution had been
amended to provide that the state could incorporate federal income tax
provisions: what the state constitution generally prohibited, it now specifically
allowed).
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incorporation in the states reveals some generally accepted
principles.
The Dexter presumption was originally crafted as an interpretive
canon applicable to cross-references. The Dexter case involved one
Florida statute's incorporation of another Florida statute. The rule
is often still expressed in that same way: "When the adopting
statute incorporates an earlier statute or a limited and a particular
provision thereof by specific reference, such incorporation takes
the statute as it existed at the time of incorporation and does not
prospectively include subsequent modifications or a repeal of the
incorporated statute or portions thereof., 2
20
As has been shown, however, the Dexter presumption came to
be more broadly applied to law promulgated by other government
and private entities. 22 1  This expansion immediately brought
incorporation by reference into direct contact with the non-
delegation doctrine. In examining this interaction, references will
be categorized here as either "internal" or "external." Although
this distinction is only indirectly discussed in the case law, it is
very useful in predicting and explaining the judicial decisions.
An internal reference is here defined as an adoption of material
which is promulgated under the direct legal authority of the
governmental entity making the reference. If state agency "A" has
a rule that incorporates by reference a manual published by agency
"A," a form designed by agency "A," or another rule of agency
"A," the rule contains an internal reference. The most common
internal references are known as cross-references.222 A cross-
reference is a reference to another portion of the same body of
legislation in which the reference occurs, 223 and so cross-
references constitute a subset of internal references. The reference
in one rule of agency "A" to another rule of the same agency
220. Haw. Providers Network, Inc. v. AIG Haw. Ins. Co., Inc., 98 P.3d 233,
242 (Haw. 2004) (emphasis added) (citing Union Cemetery v. City of
Milwaukee, 108 N.W.2d 180, 181-82 (Wis. 1961)).
221. Hecht v. Shaw, 151 So. 333, 333 (Fla. 1933) ("It is a general rule that
when a statute adopts a part or all of another statute, domestic or foreign,
general or local, by a specific and descriptive reference thereto, the adoption
takes the statute as it exists at that time." (emphasis added)).
222. The widespread use of the cross-reference was noted supra note 2.
223. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 543 (1976)
defines a cross-reference as "a notation or direction at one part of a work
referring to pertinent information at another part."
2008] 1253
4LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
would be a cross-reference, but references to a manual or form
published by the same agency would not be, though all would be
internal references. The more general term internal reference will
be used here, for there is no practical difference in the legal
treatment of cross-references and other internal references for
purposes of the non-delegation doctrine.224
An external reference, on the other hand, is to material not
promulgated under the direct legal authority of the adopting body.
A state statute that refers to a federal statute contains an external
reference because the state legislature exercises no direct legal
control over the content of the federal statute. External references
need not be to legislation of other government entities. If a county
ordinance refers to standards for wind resistance established by the
International Code Council, a non-governmental association, this is
also an external reference, since the county exercises no direct
legal control over the content of such standards.
When an internal incorporative reference is used, no delegation
concerns arise. It is axiomatic that any delegation from a
legislative body to itself-if that can be considered a delegation at
all-s not an unconstitutional one, for exercise of the power by the
legislative body is by definition consistent with the constitutional
or charter provision originally vesting that power.
225
When an external incorporative reference adopts only material
in existence at the time the reference is made, there is similarly no
224. It should be noted that for other purposes of the incorporation doctrine,
the distinction may be important. Florida Senate Bill 704 (2008), not yet signed
into law by the Governor, would amend Florida's Administrative Procedure Act
to distinguish cross-references from other internal references made in an
administrative agency rule. It would make all cross-references automatically
adopt any future changes made in the referenced rules without requiring
amendment of the referencing rule (unless a contrary intent appears in the
referencing rule). Other internal references, for example to agency manuals or
forms, would continue to incorporate those materials only as they existed on the
date of reference. This amendment would conform the law regarding cross-
references to the usual expectation of the reader, while at the same time
preserving the important requirement that subsequent changes in agency
manuals and forms become effective only after rulemaking.
225. This logical conclusion has been followed in the cases and recognized
by several commentators. See, e.g., Read, supra note 4, at 283. Depending on
how the "delegation" was effected, of course, other procedural issues might
arise.
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delegation. 226  The adopting governmental body, in referencing
existing external material, has had full opportunity to consider the
content of this referenced material and so retains complete policy
discretion. The legislating body may choose to adopt all of the
external material without change, adopt it with modification, or not
adopt it. There is no abdication. It is therefore critical in applying
the non-delegation doctrine to determine if material is adopted
only as it exists at the time of adoption. As has been shown, in the
absence of more explicit expression of legislative intent, the Dexter
presumption infers the intent to incorporate material only as it
exists at the moment of adoption whenever a specific reference is
used.227
When an external incorporative reference purports to adopt not
only material in existence at the time the reference is made, but
also subsequent changes to that material, most states have
recognized that an unconstitutional delegation arises under some
circumstances. 228 It is impossible for the legislating body to know
226. See, e.g., Riggins v. State, 369 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1979) (holding that a
Florida statute which incorporated federal law in determining eligibility for the
food stamp program as it existed on the date the Florida statute was enacted was
not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority).
227. See supra Part IV.A.
228. See Oklahoma City v. Okla. Dep't of Labor, 918 P.2d 26 (Okla. 1995)
(holding unconstitutional a statute adopting the wage level set under the Federal
Davis-Bacon Act as delegating legislative authority); Clemons v. Harvey, 525
N.W.2d 185 (Neb. 1994) (holding a state incorporation of federal law could not
constitutionally include provisions relating to medical assistance coverage for
caretaker relatives that were not part of the federal law at the time of adoption
but were adopted subsequently); Radecki v. Dir. of Bureau of Worker's
Disability Comp., 526 N.W.2d 611 (Mich. 1994) (holding the Worker's
Disability Compensation Act incorporated by reference existing federal law
because it would be an unlawful delegation of legislative power to adopt future
legislation); State v. Christie, 766 P.2d 1198 (Haw. 1988) (holding state
legislation adopting future legislation of another sovereign entity constitutes an
unlawful delegation of legislative power); State v. Thompson, 627 S.W.2d 298
(Mo. 1982) (finding no delegation of power to control substances in Missouri
through incorporation of federal statutes where substance is controlled only if
the state must act to issue a rule after federal action); Lee v. State, 635 P.2d
1282 (Mont. 1981) (finding the legislature has authority to adopt existing federal
statutes but requiring state authorities to adopt speed limits set under
incorporated federal law is unconstitutional delegation); Gumbhir v. Kan. State
Bd. of Pharmacy, 618 P.2d 837 (Kan. 1980) (finding unconstitutional a statute
requiring a degree from a school accredited by a private organization from time
to time); State v. Rodriguez, 379 So. 2d 1084 (La. 1980) (finding it
unconstitutional for Louisiana to delegate to a federal agency or Congress its
legislative power to make the possession of certain drugs a crime); State v.
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Williams, 583 P.2d 251 (Ariz. 1978) (holding incorporation of regulations of a
state department on unauthorized use of food stamps into state criminal law was
a legitimate exercise of legislative power, but reference to future pronouncement
in federal law would constitute unconstitutional delegation); State v. Dougall,
570 P.2d 135 (Wash. 1977) (finding an unconstitutional delegation for future
federal designation of controlled substances to become controlled in Washington
without affirmative state action); First Fed. Sav. & Loan v. State Tax Comm'n,
363 N.E.2d 474 (Mass. 1977) (finding constitutional a federal determination that
deduction was allowed to a savings and loan because no future federal law was
accepted as the law of the Commonwealth); N. Lights Motel, Inc. v. Sweaney,
561 P.2d 1176 (Alaska 1977) (finding no unconstitutional delegation in adoption
of a code written by a national organization provided that no attempt was made
to adopt future amendments); People v. Harper, 562 P.2d 1112 (Colo. 1977)
(finding constitutional a statute incorporating only the scope of the federal
enactment at the time of adoption and not future or prospective changes); Hogen
v. S.D. State Bd. of Transp., 245 N.W.2d 493 (S.D. 1976) (finding
unconstitutional statutory direction to an agency to comply with all future
changes in federal billboard or junk yard laws); State v. Welch, 363 A.2d 1356
(R.I. 1976) (holding that state incorporation of a federal controlled substances
law could not constitutionally include subsequent changes that classified
phencyclidine as a controlled substance); State v. Grinstead, 206 S.E.2d 912 (W.
Va. 1974) (attempted adoption of future federal law controlling LSD was
unconstitutional as an unlawful delegation of the legislative power); State v.
Julson, 202 N.W.2d 145 (N.D. 1972) (interpreting a statute which incorporated
provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to adopt only those
provisions in existence at the time of adoption so the statute was not an unlawful
delegation of legislative power); Wallace v. Comm'r of Taxation, 184 N.W.2d
588 (Minn. 1971) (finding a statute adopted federal provisions on sick pay
which were in force at the time and could not grant to Congress the right to
make future modifications or changes in Minnesota law); Cheney v. St. Louis
Sw. Ry. Co., 394 S.W.2d 731 (Ark. 1965) (finding an unconstitutional
delegation for a statute determining certain taxable income through
incorporation of future Federal Interstate Commerce Commission regulations);
Idaho Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Roden, 350 P.2d 225 (Idaho 1960) (finding
unconstitutional provisions that delegated legislative power to the Congress and
the Home Loan Bank Board to make future laws and regulations governing
appellant's business); Seale v. McKennon, 336 P.2d 340 (Or. 1959) (finding
unconstitutional a statutory direction to a state agency to adopt as the law of
Oregon future laws of the United States and regulations of a federal agency);
Dawson v. Hamilton, 314 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1958) (finding unconstitutional a
state statute to the extent it adopts time standards to be fixed in the future by the
Federal Congress or the I.C.C.); City of Cleveland v. Piskura, 60 N.E.2d 919
(Ohio 1945) (finding a city ordinance adopting future changes to federal law
was an unlawful abdication of legislative authority); Hutchins v. Mayo, 197 So.
495 (Fla. 1940) (finding invalid a Citrus Commission rule that adopted federal
standards for citrus fruits "as thereafter amended"); Holgate Bros. Co. v.
Bashore, 200 A. 672 (Pa. 1938) (finding invalid a statute conforming working
hours to schedule established by federal regulation as delegating power to a
federal authority); Darweger v. Staats, 243 N.E. 380 (N.Y. 1935) (finding an
unconstititutional delegation where a New York statute adopted federal NRA
codes); Green v. City of Atlanta, 135 S.E. 84 (Ga. 1926) (holding that a
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what changes may later be made by the entity promulgating the
referenced material, or to exercise policy discretion with respect to
those changes. The conclusion is that the legislating body has
therefore allowed future amendment of the governing law to occur
without the exercise of its discretion and so has abdicated its
assigned role. In the absence of more explicit expression of
legislative intent, the Dexter presumption infers the intent to adopt
any future changes that might be made to the referenced material
whenever a general reference is used.229
But if most states have at times recognized this relationship
between incorporation and non-delegation, this is not to say that
they have consistently done so.230 Statutes incorporating laws
prescribing judicial procedures, rather than substantive law, have
reference ordinance fixing future salaries of Atlanta firemen by salaries of
federal mail carriers was a surrender of legislative power); State v. Intoxicating
Liquors, 117 A. 588 (Me. 1922) (finding invalid a statute incorporating by
reference future enactments of Congress establishing definition of intoxicating
liquors); Santee Mills v. Query, 115 S.E. 202 (S.C. 1922) (holding that a statute
incorporating U.S. Department of Internal Revenue regulations did not
incorporate future changes, but to do so would be unconstitutional); Wagner v.
City of Milwaukee, 188 N.W. 487 (Wis. 1922) (finding unconstitutional an
ordinance setting wages for city contractors to those set in the union scale as it
might change from time to time); Ex parte Elliott, 973 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App.
1998) (construing a statute adopting federal law to be laws in effect at the time
of reference to preserve its constitutionality); State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990) (holding that crime definition and penalty powers are essential
legislative functions that cannot constitutionally be delegated through
incorporation of U.S. regulations); People v. Pollution Control Bd., 404 N.E.2d
352 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that legislative adoption of a private sporting
group's sanction of events was an improper delegation of legislative authority);
People v. Kruger, 121 Cal. Rptr. 581 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1975)
(invalidating a state regulation adopting future federal regulations on yellowfin
tuna as unconstitutional); Wilentz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 172 A. 903 (N.J.
Ch. 1934) (holding that the legislature could follow the federal government's
policy, but it could not adopt it by reference to extent that New Jersey law would
be later superceded by federal law).
229. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
230. At least one commentator has suggested that it is impossible to discern
any governing principles in incorporation by reference doctrine and urged the
consideration of the need for uniformity in the substantive area being regulated.
See Arnold Rochvarg, State Adoption of Federal Law--Legislative Abdication
or Reasoned Policymaking, 36 ADMIN. L. REv. 277 (1984). While the perceived
inconsistencies in almost all of the specific examples cited by Rochvarg seem to
be explained by the principles outlined in this Article, the larger point that
logical inconsistencies do exist cannot be denied.
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sometimes been held to be "ambulatory" in adopting future
changes to referenced external law without running afoul of the
non-delegation doctrine.2 3 1 Incorporations of accreditation lists, or
criteria for specialized educational institutions, or practice
standards issued by professional associations have often been
exempted from application of the non-delegation doctrine.232
231. A series of early Florida cases seemed to flirt with this exception, but
not expressly adopt it. Kahn v. Weinlander, 22 So. 653 (Fla. 1897) held that an
act of 1828 that adopted rules of practice in U.S. courts by specific reference
nevertheless made subsequent changes to the federal rules applicable in
chancery causes in the courts of the Florida territory, but made no mention of
non-delegation). Then Farrell v. Forest Inv. Co., 74 So. 216 (Fla. 1917)
changed the specific rule of practice followed in Weinlander because of yet
another change in U.S. chancery rules, again without discussing non-delegation.
Later Surrency v. Winn & Lovett Grocery Co., 34 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1948)
suggested incorporation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to
depositions was ambulatory but again did not discuss unconstitutional
delegation, though the court did mention that both statutes related to procedural
law. The constitutional prohibitions against incorporation by reference in New
Jersey, New York, and New Mexico have sometimes been said to prohibit only
the future adoption of substantive changes, not procedural ones. See Port of
N.Y. Auth. v. Heming, 167 A.2d 609 (N.J. 1961) (finding a statute which
adopted by reference only procedure necessary to effectuate its purposes was not
prohibited by article IV, section 7); Burke v. Kern, 38 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. 1941)
(holding incorporation of procedure is not a violation of article III, section 16);
Ballew v. Denson, 320 P.2d 382 (N.M. 1958) (holding procedural law may be
adopted by another statute by reference without violation of constitutional article
4, section 16).
232. Accreditation issues may or may not involve incorporation by reference,
depending on whether actual materials, as opposed to the entities producing
those materials, are referenced in the legislation. Incorporation doctrine should
be consistent with a state's general policy as to such delegations, however. The
general rule is that accreditation by professional associations is not an
unconstitutional delegation. See, e.g., Lucas v. Me. Comm'n of Pharmacy, 472
A.2d 904 (Me. 1984) (finding a statute requiring a degree from a pharmacy
school to be accredited by the American Council on Pharmaceutical Education
not unconstitutional); In re Murphy, 393 A.2d 369 (Pa. 1978), appeal dismissed,
440 U.S. 901 (1979) (holding a requirement that a law degree be from an ABA
accredited law school is not an unconstitutional delegation); Ex parte Gerino, 77
P. 166 (Cal. 1904) (finding that a statute prescribing that State Board of Medical
Examiners should accept standards for diplomas prescribed from time to time by
an association composed of colleges devoted to the work of preparing persons
for the profession, makes the standard sufficiently fixed, definite, and certain);
and cases cited therein. Florida is a bit equivocal. In Attwood v. State ex rel.
Newman, 53 So. 2d 825, 827 (Fla. 1951), an "accredited college of pharmacy"
was construed as necessarily being fixed as of the date of the enactment to
preserve the constitutionality of the statute. Similarly, in Spencer v. Hunt, 147
So. 282, 287 (Fla. 1933), it was held that it did not matter whether accredited
dental colleges meant only those colleges already accredited or those that a
board determines later to be accredited, as that term was defined on the date the
[Vol. 681258
2008] LOOKING GLASS LA W 1259
While generally adoption of promulgations of private entities is
found to be unconstitutional, in other cases it is not.2 33 Reciprocal
law took effect, but there would be an unconstitutional delegation if the statute
were interpreted to allow the board to redefine "accredited" from time to time.
Cf State ex rel. Kaplan v. Dee, 77 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1955) (upholding a statute
requiring an applicant to be a graduate of a veterinary college recognized by the
AVMA, but not expressly discussing how changes in the list of schools
"recognized" from time to time would be interpreted); Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs
ex rel. Barry Univ. Sch. of Law, 821 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 2002) (in which the
timing issue is similarly not discussed, but in which the nature of the delegation
under consideration that the ABA have accredited a law school within a
specified time from graduation implicitly applied the court's ruling that no
unconstitutional delegation was involved to changes in accreditation from time
to time). But see Gumbhir, 618 P.2d 837 (finding unconstitutional a statute
requiring a degree from a school to be accredited by a private organization in the
future); Allen v. State Bd. of Veterinarians, 52 A.2d 131 (R.I. 1947) (finding
constitutional a statute requiring graduation from veterinary school recognized
by AVMA must adopt standards in place when the statute was enacted, not as
changed over time); State ex rel. Kirschner v. Urquhart, 310 P.2d 261 (Wash.
1957) (finding unconstitutional a statute that declares accredited schools to be
those on a list thereafter promulgated by a private association as attempting to
delegate legislative power).
233. Plastic Pipe & Fittings Ass'n v. Cal. Bldg. Standards Comm'n, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (finding no unconstitutional delegation to the
International Association of Plumbing and Mechanical Officials where there
was no automatic approval of future changes); Kingery v. Chapple, 504 P.2d
831 (Alaska 1972) (approving a regulation incorporating motorcycle safety
standards of the United States Standards Institute Safety Code, but noting that
automatic incorporation of future changes would be unconstitutional); Hillman
v. N. Wasco County People's Util. Dist., 323 P.2d 664 (Or. 1958) (finding
unconstitutional the adoption of the national electrical code as it was changed
from time to time); Blitch v. City of Ocala, 195 So. 406 (Fla. 1940) (holding that
a municipal ordinance requiring roofing shingles to conform to test
specifications of the National Board of Fire Underwriters would be invalid as a
delegation of authority if held to include future changes); City of Tucson v.
Stewart, 40 P.2d 72 (Ariz. 1935) (finding it unconstitutional to allow an
ordinance requiring construction to be in accordance with future regulations of a
private association); Wagner, 188 N.W. 487 (finding unconstitutional an
ordinance that set wage rates paid to city contractors to the wage set by the
union scale as it might change from time to time); State v. Crawford, 177 P. 360
(Kan. 1919) (finding adoption of an electrical code promulgated by a private
organization and revised from time to time was an unconstitutional delegation);
People v. Pollution Control Bd., 404 N.E.2d 352 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding
legislative adoption of private sporting group's sanction of events was an
improper delegation of legislative authority); People v. Mobil Oil Corp., 422
N.Y.S.2d 589 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1979) (finding that local government adoption of a
private association's future standards on flammable and combustible liquids was
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority). But see Colo.
Polytechnic Coll. v. State Bd. for Cinty. Colls. & Occupational Educ., 476 P.2d
38, 42 (Colo. 1970) (finding a statute incorporating accreditation standards of
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legislation, imposing a tax or fee on foreign corporations doing
business in a state based upon incorporation by reference of the
fees that similar corporations must pay in the referenced state, is
also often found to be constitutional. Many other cases construe
legislation referencing external materials in such a way as to avoid
constitutional issues.
private associations of colleges for purposes for matriculation was not
unconstitutional); State v. Wakeen, 57 N.W.2d 364 (Wis. 1953) (finding a
statute adopting the definition of "drug" from United States Pharmacopeia and
any future changes was not an unconstitutional delegation); and cases cited
therein.
234. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Motor Ins. Corp., 605 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 1992)
(holding incorporation of future enactments of other states into a formula for
measuring Florida's retaliatory tax was not unconstitutional delegation). Cases
are often not clear because they mix consideration of federal due process or
equal protection grounds. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869
(1985). At least one state, in an old case, found such reciprocity to constitute an
unconstitutional delegation, however. Clark v. Port of Mobile, 67 Ala. 217 (Ala.
1880) (finding a reciprocity statute setting the amount of the Alabama insurance
license tax based on other state's taxes violated the prohibition on delegation of
power). Cases upholding reciprocity schemes often consider them as extensions
of the theory underlying contingency statutes, mentioned infra notes 293-95 and
accompanying text.
235. In Brazil v. Division of Administration, State Department of
Transportation, 347 So. 2d 755, 757 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), the statute
provided that it was the duty of the department to regulate signs relating to food,
lodging, camping, vehicle service, and attractions "subject to current federal
regulations." (emphasis added). This was held ambiguous because the term
"current" could be read to mean those regulations "current" when the adoption
took place, or "current" at a later time when the department was carrying out its
responsibilities. The court, noting that it would be an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power for the legislature to adopt a federal rule in
advance, interpreted the statute as incorporating only those regulations in effect
at the time of the statute's enactment. Id at 758.
The canon counseling the judiciary to interpret legislation in a constitutional
manner can easily collide with the Dexter presumption. In State v. Rodriquez,
365 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1978), all seven members of the Florida Supreme Court
agreed that a Florida statute which purported to adopt future changes to federal
food stamp legislation would be unconstitutional. Four justices concluded that
the legislation at issue only incorporated federal law as it existed when the
Florida statute was enacted, and so held the statute constitutional; three justices
dissented, concluding that the Florida statute unconstitutionally incorporated
future federal law. Id at 160-61. The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice
Sundberg, argued that the distinction between general and specific references
must be applied to the Florida statute. Id at 162 (Sundberg, J., dissenting). He
maintained that since the reference was clearly a general one, making criminal
as it did the use, transfer, acquisition, alteration, or possession of food stamps
"in any manner not authorized by law" without citing any specific federal statute
or regulation, the reference incorporated future changes, and so constituted an
LOOKING GLASS LA W
B. Intergovernmental Relations
Intergovernmental relations are naturally affected by
incorporation by reference and the non-delegation doctrine.
Federal adoption of state or local legislation is of course governed
by federal law, and so unconstitutional delegation is not generally
found.2 36  Local government adoption of state and federal law is
fairly common, and has received mixed treatment.
237
unconstitutional delegation. Id. See also Exparte Elliott, 973 S.W.2d 737 (Tex.
App. 1998) (interpreting a statute adopting federal regulations "as amended" to
mean as they had been amended up to the time of adoption by reference, thus the
statute was not an unconstitutional delegation); Clemons v. Harvey, 525 N.W.2d
185 (Neb. 1994) (concluding a state incorporation of federal law could not
include provisions relating to medical assistance coverage that was not part of
the federal law at the time of adoption); State v. Gill, 584 N.E.2d 1200 (Ohio
1992) (interpreting a statute incorporating federal food stamp law "as amended"
as adopting only those provisions existing on that date to preserve
constitutionality); Indep. Cmty. Bankers Ass'n v. State, 346 N.W.2d 737 (S.D.
1984) (finding a reference to the Federal Bank Holding Company Act "as
amended" meant as it existed at the moment of reference); State v. Julson, 202
N.W.2d 145 (N.D. 1972) (interpreting a statute incorporating provisions of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to adopt only provisions in existence at
the time of adoption to preserve constitutionality); Johnston v. State, 181 S.E.2d
42 (Ga. 1971) (finding a statute not unconstitutional if its incorporation is
limited to present regulations); Wallace v. Comm'r of Taxation, 184 N.W.2d
588 (Minn. 1971) (limiting adopted federal provisions on sick pay to those in
force at the time); Seale v. McKennon, 336 P.2d 340 (Or. 1959) (interpreting
"and to maintain that status" as only referring to one section referenced to
preserve constitutionality); Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, 195 P.2d 1 (Cal.
1948) (interpreting a reference as specific to avoid the issue of constitutionality);
Blitch v. City of Ocala, 195 So. 406 (Fla. 1940) (holding a municipal ordinance
to have referenced only specifications in existence on the date the ordinance
took effect to preserve constitutionality). A critique of such restrictive
interpretations may be found in Jonathan E. Becker, State v. Gill: Unconstitutional
Delegations Go Uncorrected, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 169 (1993).
236. Except for two 1935 cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has never declared a
statute unconstitutional on delegation grounds, despite frequent statements that
the legislative power may not be delegated. As would be expected,
incorporations of future state and local law similarly pass muster. Incorporation
of state criminal law arises under the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), which
provides that when a person on a federal enclave commits an act that is not a
violation of federal law but is a violation of the laws of the state in which the
enclave is located, the person may be prosecuted in federal court and shall be
subject to a punishment like that provided for by state law. 18 U.S.C. § 13
(2006).
237. In State ex rel. Springer v. Smith, 189 So. 2d 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1966), the court was confronted with a city ordinance that made unlawful the
commission of any act recognized as a misdemeanor by the Florida Statutes.
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State incorporation of provisions of the U.S. Code and Code of
Federal Regulations will be considered here in greater detail.
These incorporations are especially critical because they implicate
the fundamental relationship between the states and the national
government in our federal system. While states have probably
adopted federal law on almost every imaginable subject,
historically there have been a few issues that have resulted in
numerous states adopting the same or similar law. These subject
One issue before the court was whether the ordinance prohibited acts that the
State of Florida did not declare to be misdemeanors until after the ordinance
took effect in 1955. Id. at 847. The court cited Hecht v. Shaw, 151 So. 333 (Fla.
1933), for the Dexter presumption that when a statute incorporates the law on a
particular subject generally, it includes not only the law in force on the date the
adopting statute becomes effective, but also all subsequent laws on that subject.
Id. The fourth district then ended its inquiry, apparently concluding that the
Hecht case authorized the city to make such a future incorporation. Id. at 848.
The Hecht case, of course, concerned one Florida statute adopting another
Florida statute-an internal reference-so no delegation was possible there. 151
So. at 333. In Smith, by contrast, the court determined that it was the
municipality's intent to delegate the authority to define violations of the city's
own ordinance to an external entity: the state legislature. 189 So. 2d at 848.
Similarly, in Jaramillo v. City of Homestead, 322 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1975), the
Florida Supreme Court stated in dicta that an ordinance which incorporated state
law by general reference resulted in subsequent amendments and repeals of the
state law having the effect of amending the municipal ordinance. Id. at 498.
These cases do not appear to have considered Florida Statutes section
165.091, which expressly restricted municipal incorporation by reference to
material in existence on the date of adoption, and which seems to have been in
effect in each case when the adoptions were made. Section 165.091 was
repealed by 1974 FLA. LAWS 74-192. As discussed in the case of State ex rel.
McFarland v. Roberts, 74 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1954), the authority to incorporate
state misdemeanors existed prior to the enactment of section 165.091 under the
charter power of cities under Florida's constitution. Id. at 89. The Florida
Supreme Court recognized in Rodriquez, 365 So. 2d 157, that a general
reference provides no immunity from application of the non-delegation doctrine
when an external reference is involved. Id. at 160. Since local governments are
subdivisions of a sovereign state, it is conceivable that some special exception to
non-delegation may exist, but research did not uncover any commentary or case
containing a reasonable explanation of why this might be so. The cases more
often just cite to historical precedent, which is mixed. Compare Robinson v.
Tax Comm'r, 574 N.E.2d 596 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1989) (finding a municipal tax
ordinance referencing future amendment of state statute was an unlawful
delegation of legislative authority), with Evans v. Sunshine Jr. Stores, 587 So.
2d 312 (Ala. 1991) (finding that a municipal ordinance that referred generally to
law relating to the subject under consideration adopted subsequent
modifications, including the repeal of the state statute it referenced).
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areas provide useful points to compare the treatment of
incorporation in the different states.
1. Prohibition
Prohibition was one of the first experiments in concurrent
federal and state enforcement. The structure imposed by the
Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 238  and the
National Prohibition Act (the Volstead Act)239 allowed states to
take disparate approaches to implementing prohibition. A few
state statutes that incorporated provisions of the federal act by
reference found their way to the courts. Massachusetts determined
that state incorporation of provisions of substantive law to be
passed by the Congress in the future constituted unconstitutional
delegation in violation of their state constitution.24 °  Maine
concurred.24 1  The California Supreme Court "conceded" that
statutes with future incorporation would be unconstitutional, but
expressly declined to apply that rule to the Volstead Act, since
future incorporation was not applicable to the case at hand.242 The
Nevada Supreme Court invalidated that state's statute on the
grounds that the title of the act had not properly expressed the
subject in its title as constitutionally required, referring as it did to
only the National Prohibition Act and containing no other
description; but delegation apparently lurked in the shadows. 243 in
238. The Eighteenth Amendment was ratified by the requisite number of
states by January 29, 1919.
239. National Prohibition Act, 41 Stat. 305 (Oct. 28, 1919) repealed by U.S.
CONST. amend. XXI.
240. In re Opinion of the Justices, 133 N.E. 453 (Mass. 1921).
241. See State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 117 A. 588 (Me. 1922). Maine had
amended its liquor law to define "any beverage containing a percentage of
alcohol, which by federal enactment, or by decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, now or hereafter declared, renders a beverage intoxicating" to be
intoxicating under state law. Id. at 589. At the time of enactment of the state
statute, the Eighteenth Amendment had been ratified, but the Volstead Act had
not become law.
242. Ex parte Burke, 212 P. 193, 194 (Cal. 1923) (finding nothing in the
statute which made it invalid so far as it adopted the existing provisions of the
Volstead Act).
243. Ex parte Mantell, 216 P. 509, 510 (Nev. 1923). The dissent interestingly
mentions an "official opinion of the Attorney General" that had concluded the
statute was unconstitutional as making future amendments of the U.S. Congress
part of the Nevada law, but this issue was not before the court. Id. at 511.
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New Mexico, the state's statute was found invalid under the
constitutional provision against amendatory references, the court
finding it also applicable to certain incorporative references. 2 "
But consider treatment of the delegation issue in
Pennsylvania, 245 which had incorporated into its statute the federal
definition of "intoxicating liquor" just as the Maine statute had, yet
found no unconstitutional delegation. The opinion concluded that
a provision that made no change whatsoever in the law and could
have been omitted without effect could not invalidate the statute.
246
The court went on to address in greater detail the question of
whether there had been a violation of the state's constitutional
prohibition against amendatory references, 247 concluding there had
not.
2. New Deal Legislation
In the 1930s, there was a wave of federal and state interacting
legislation intended to address the Great Depression. Again, a few
states utilized incorporation by reference. In Pennsylvania, the
supreme court took a very different position than it had in the
prohibition case fifteen years earlier.248 Before the court was a
state statute directing a state department to set a schedule of hours
of labor and providing that this schedule had to conform to
schedules to be later established by federal authorities.249  The
court declared it unconstitutional, saying, "A more sweeping
abdication of power and duty it would be difficult to imagine. '' 25
New York invalidated a state statute requiring the state to file
copies of all federal regulations promulgated to implement the
National Industrial Recovery Act and making these regulations
244. State v. Armstrong, 243 P. 333 (N.M. 1924) (a detailed analysis finding
state adoption of the Volstead Act to be "blind legislation" and concluding the
admittedly incorporative reference was covered by the constitutional
prohibition).
245. Commonwealth v. Alderman, 119 A. 551 (Pa. 1923). The court notes
that the Volstead Act, the only piece of legislation on the subject, was enacted
prior to the indictment. Id. at 553.
246. Id. at 552-53.
247. See the discussion of amendatory references supra Part II.A.2.
248. Holgate Bros. v. Bashore, 200 A. 672 (Pa. 1938).
249. Id. at 674.
250. Id. at 678.
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New York law.2 5 1  New Jersey invalidated a state statute
essentially providing that the National Industrial Recovery Act was
to be the state code. 252  The court called the statute "vicious
legislation" and declared that the New Jersey Legislature must
declare the law. 2 53  In Nebraska, a state statute appropriating
money for work relief under terms and conditions provided by an
act of Congress to be passed in the future was declared
unconstitutional.E54
In California, the State Agricultural Adjustment Act created a
more subtle link to the National Agricultural Adjustment Act. The
orders and regulations of the Federal Secretary of Agriculture
"heretofore or hereafter made" were declared to be California law
"when and in so far as within the standards" specified in the state
act.255 The state director was authorized by the statute to issue
marketing licenses consistent with federal regulations only after
having made an affirmative administrative determination that the
federal regulations carried out the purposes of the state act and
conformed to its standards.256 In Brock v. Superior Court, the
California Supreme Court approved, concluding:
There is, therefore, no automatic incorporation by reference
of future federal laws, but a declared policy of making our
law correspond with federal regulation under circumstances
set forth in our statute, and an adequate, constitutional
means for carrying that policy into effect.257
The court therefore held that the insertion of an accountable
intermediary-exercising the discretion of the state consistent with
standards set forth in California law-destroyed any
unconstitutional link between state law and future federal law. The
court upheld the statute against contentions that it constituted both
an unconstitutional delegation to the state director and an
251. Darweger v. Staats, 196 N.E. 61 (N.Y. 1935).
252. Wilentz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 172 A. 903 (N.J. Ch. 1934).
253. Id.
254. Smithberger v. Banning, 262 N.W. 492 (Neb. 1935).
255. Brock v. Superior Court, 71 P.2d 209, 212 (Cal. 1937).
256. Id. at 211.
257. Id. at 213.
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unconstitutional delegation to the Congress and the U.S. Secretary
of Agriculture.
258
3. Taxation
The complicated tax codes enacted by the federal government
and most states have offered another area in which states have
often sought to adopt federal definitions, procedures, deductions,
and even rates.259 Comparison of these cases reveals no general
rule about the extent to which this may constitutionally be done.
Some states have invalidated provisions adopting future
changes.26 ° Others have explicitly adopted provisions of the
federal tax code only as they exist at the time of adoption; other
courts have construed incorporating statutes in that way to avoid
application of the rule that incorporation of future changes would261
be unconstitutional delegation. In addition, Colorado, Kansas,
Missouri, Nebraska, New York, and Virginia have adopted state
constitutional amendments allowing state incorporation of federal
258. Id.
259. Jim B. Grant, Jr., Conforming the State Income Tax to Federal Tax
Law: Prospective Incorporation of Federal Changes and the Non-delegation
Doctrine, 40 ALA. L. REV. 233 (1988).
260. See Cheney v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 394 S.W.2d 731 (Ark. 1965)
(holding that establishing the appellee's tax liability to the state based upon a
formula subject to prospective federal legislation or administrative rules was
unconstitutional).
261. Florida readopts the provisions of the United States Internal Revenue
Code each year, see FLA. STAT. § 220.03(1)(n) (2007), to avoid any questions of
unconstitutionality. Note that the Florida Supreme Court held in Presbyterian
Homes of Synod of Florida v. Wood, 297 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1974) that a statute
granting tax exemptions to homes for the aged based upon income limitations of
the residents was unconstitutional because it provided that these income
limitations were to be adjusted to conform to later increases established by the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. See also Thorpe v.
Mahin, 250 N.E.2d 633 (Ill. 1969) (finding a statute adopting federal income tax
law as it was in effect on the date of state enactment was not an unconstitutional
delegation of state legislative power to Congress); Featherstone v. Norman, 153
S.E. 58 (Ga. 1930) (finding adoption of existing exemptions and method of
income tax was not unconstitutional where the statute did not make future
federal legislation part of the state law); Santee Mills v. Query, 115 S.E. 202
(S.C. 1922) (reviewing an adoption of federal tax regulations that was
ambiguous as to its intention to adopt future changes and interpreting it as
adopting only existing law to keep the statute to the legitimate field of
legislation).
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tax law. 262  But at least five states have decided that future
incorporation of some provisions of federal tax law is not an
unconstitutional delegation.
263
4. Drug Laws
The discovery and development of new drugs has made the
control and prosecution of controlled substances a dynamic area.
Many states have tried to adopt provisions of federal law
classifying such drugs to draw upon greater federal scientific
expertise and to promote uniformity. In Freimuth v. State, a
Florida statute enacted in 1967 specifically described certain types
of drugs that were prohibited but went on to restrict "any other
drug to which the drug abuse laws of the United States apply."
264
The opinion noted that at the time of the incorporation, the
hallucinogenic drug STP was not registered by the federal
262. See COLO. CONST. art. X, § 19; KAN. CONST. art. 11, § 11; MO. CONST.
art. X, § 4(d); NEB. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 22; VA.
CONST. art. IV, § 11. See also Carter v. Dir. of Revenue, 805 S.W.2d 154 (Mo.
1991); Anderson v. Tiemann, 155 N.W.2d 322 (Neb. 1967); Rathborne v.
Collector of Revenue, 200 So. 149 (La. 1941) (holding that a state statute
adopting definition of "capital assets" from federal statute could not mean
subsequently adopted changes since under article III, section 18, the legislature
shall never adopt a system or code of laws only by general reference).
263. See McFaddin v. Jackson, 738 S.W.2d 176 (Tenn. 1987) (holding that a
statute adopting provisions of the federal tax code included future amendments
but was not unconstitutional delegation since Tennessee had fixed the rates of
the inheritance tax); First Fed. Sav. & Loan v. State Tax Comm'n, 363 N.E.2d
474 (Mass. 1977) (finding that a federal determination on deduction allowed to a
savings and loan is not a case in which future federal law is accepted by the
legislature as the law of the Commonwealth and thus is not an unconstitutional
delegation of power); Katzenberg v. Comptroller of Treasury, 282 A.2d 465
(Md. 1971) (holding that state adoption of a federal definition of "income" is not
an unconstitutional delegation without discussion of the effect of future changes,
but that the statute appeared to refer to future changes); Commonwealth v.
Warner Bros. Theatres, 27 A.2d 62 (Pa. 1942) (holding statutory adoption of a
federal definition of "net income" in excise tax was not an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power notwithstanding that the amount of the deduction
varied by federal law from time to time); Underwood Typewriter Co. v.
Chamberlain, 108 A. 154 (Conn. 1919) (finding that a state statute imposing a
tax based upon the net income subject to taxation under federal law did not
represent an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to Congress,
particularly where the state statute made no attempt to include future legislation
or regulations).
264. 272 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla. 1972).
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government: it did not appear in the Federal Register until 1968.265
The court held that it would be an unconstitutional delegation to
apply amendments to the federal regulations that occurred after the
enactment of the Florida law.z66 This view is widely held.267
A few states 2 68 have upheld drug abuse statutes patterned after
the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. While some of these
cases address different arguments, cases considering whether or
not there was an unconstitutional delegation to the federal
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding
unconstitutional an incorporation of federal provisions definitioning crime and
penalty); State v. Rodriguez, 379 So. 2d 1084 (La. 1980) (finding it
unconstitutional for the Louisiana legislature to delegate to a federal agency or
Congress its legislative power to make the possession of certain drugs a crime);
Cilento v. State, 377 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1979) (finding valid a statute regulating
controlled substances and incorporating a federal list when classification by the
federal agency preceded the state legislative action prohibiting sale); State v.
Dougall, 570 P.2d 135 (Wash. 1977) (finding a statute unconstitutional
delegation insofar as it permitted future federal designation of controlled
substances to become controlled or deleted substances under the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act by means of board inaction or acquiescence); People
v. Harper, 562 P.2d 1112 (Colo. 1977) (finding constitutional a statute
incorporating by reference the Federal Controlled Substances Act at a time when
natural and synthetic cocaine were prohibited substances under such Act); State
v. Welch, 363 A.2d 1356 (R.I. 1976) (holding that state incorporation of a
federal controlled substances act could not constitutionally include subsequent
changes that classified phencyclidine as a controlled substance); State v.
Grinstead, 206 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1974) (invalidating an attempted adoption of
future federal law controlling LSD as an unconstitutional delegation of the
legislative power); State v. Julson, 202 N.W.2d 145 (N.D. 1972) (interpreting a
statute incorporating provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to
adopt only provisions in existence at the time of adoption and holding it not an
unlawful delegation of legislative power); Johnston v. State, 181 S.E.2d 42 (Ga.
1971) (finding a statute not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
to Congress because its express language limits the regulations which are to be
applicable to present regulations); State v Workman, 183 N.W.2d 911 (Neb.
1971) (finding unconstitutional incorporation of a changing federal drug list);
State v. Johnson, 173 N.W.2d 894 (S.D. 1970) (finding a statute which
prohibited sale of any drug designated by regulations under federal act
unconstitutional); State v. Emery, 45 N.E. 319 (Ohio 1896) (interpreting a
reference in a statute to the United States Pharmacopoeia to refer to the then
existing edition because an attempt to incorporate future editions would be an
unconstitutional delegation).
268. See State v. Thompson, 627 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1982); Ex parte
McCurley, 390 So. 2d 25 (Ala. 1980); State v. King, 257 N.W.2d 693 (Minn.
1977); State v. Lisk, 204 S.E.2d 868 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974); Hilton v. State, 503
S.W.2d 951 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).
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government in light of that act's Brock2 69 structure are most
pertinent here. In Missouri, State v. Thompson involved a
prosecution for illegal possession of pentazocine. 2 ° The federal
Drug Enforcement Administration had placed pentazocine on the
schedule IV list of controlled substances in January of 1979. The
state Division of Health similarly controlled pentazocine about one
month later.
The Missouri Supreme Court pointed to two factors in holding
the state statute constitutional. First, the statute did not provide
that possession of any drug added to schedule IV was
automatically a violation of Missouri law or require the Division of
Health to automatically control it. 2 7 1 Rather, the statutory scheme
required the state agency to consider whether or not to similarly
restrict the drug, apply state statutory criteria in doing so,272 and
amend Missouri's schedule of controlled substances by rule,
expressly indicating that the Division of Health had no objection to
such control.273 Second, while containing a presumption of similar
control by the state, the federal government action triggered only
mandatory consideration of a substance. 274 The "default" in the
absence of affirmative state decision and implementing action was
that the substance would not be controlled.
5. Cooperative Federalism
Perhaps the most intricate examples of state and federal
interaction in government administration involve programs
coordinated by the federal government but largely implemented
through state legislation that meets federal standards. 275 Congress
ensures consistency with federal standards either by providing for
269. Brock v. Superior Court, 71 P.2d 209 (Cal. 1937) (discussed supra note
255 and accompanying text).
270. 627 S.W.2d 298.
271. ld.at30l.
272. Id at 302. The court noted that federal action was not the sole factor
considered in controlling a substance, but rather concluded that state standards
set forth throughout the statute must be applied. Id. at 301 n.2.
273. Id. at 300.
274. Id. at 303.
275. As commentators have recognized, such collaboration may have policy
benefits. Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and Constitutional Duels: Separation of
Powers and State Implementation of Federally Inspired Regulatory Programs
and Standards, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1343, 1350 (2005).
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only partial or potential preemption in conjunction with acceptable
state regulatory regimes 2 76 or by providing funding for state
programs implemented in accordance with federal standards. 277 In
each case, however, the governing law is state law.
Maintaining state consistency with federal standards over time
can be difficult. It is not impossible for state statutes to be
amended each time incorporated federal material is amended,278
but it can be a burden, particularly if the referenced material
changes frequently. If a state attempts to avoid frequent
amendments by attempting to adopt future federal changes by
reference, on the other hand, this may be held to violate the non-
delegation doctrine.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA) is a cooperative federalism program based upon partial
preemption created to establish a national system for regulating
hazardous wastes. 279 It authorizes each state to develop its own
program consistent with federal minimum standards. The Texas
Solid Waste Disposal Act defined solid waste by referencing
"solid waste identified or listed as a hazardous waste by the
administrator of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency under the federal Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended
by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as
amended. ',2
80
In Ex parte Elliott, the court noted that the final "as amended"
might be read to conclude that it was the intention of the Texas
legislature to allow future amendments to RCRA to be
automatically incorporated.281 However, the court also noted that a
specific incorporation takes the statute as it appeared at the time of
276. See, e.g., David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement
in a "Reinvented" State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and
Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2000).
277. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty"
Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REv. 813 (Feb. 1998).
278. The Florida statute adopting the United States Internal Revenue Code is
amended each year to incorporate changes made in the federal law. See FLA.
STAT. § 220.03(l)(n) (2007).
279. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k (2006).
280. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.003(12) (Vernon 2007).
281. 973 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App. 1998).
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adoption without subsequent amendments. 282  The court then
observed that a construction that was unconstitutional should be
avoided and concluded that the phrase "as amended" meant as
RCRA had been amended up to the time of its adoption by state
law, and not subsequently.2  Other states have come to similar
conclusions.284
The Medicaid Act, Title XIX of the Social Security Act, is a
cooperative federalism program based upon contingent funding
designed to provide medical assistance to persons whose income is
insufficient to meet the costs of medical care.285 A participating
state may also elect to provide various other optional medical
services outlined in federal law. In Clemens v. Harvey, questions
involving delegation of authority to the federal government
arose. 2 86 Under Medicaid, Nebraska had for many years provided
282. Id. at 742.
283. Id.
284. See State v. Carey, 920 P.2d 1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a rule
that expressly incorporated hazardous waste provisions of federal RCRA
regulations without future editions was unaffected by the invalidity of the
referenced federal regulations); People v. Harris Corp., 483 N.Y.S.2d 442 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984) (invalidating the adoption of a federal list of hazardous wastes
under RCRA where a complete copy of the federal regulations existing at the
time of adoption was not filed because the constitution forbids wholesale
incorporation of federal regulations). But see State v. All Pro Paint & Body
Shop, Inc., 639 So. 2d 707 (La. 1994) (upholding state incorporation of federal
RCRA's requirements because Louisiana retained power to adopt its own
hazardous waste laws in lieu of the federal program).
285. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-96s (2007).
286. 525 N.W.2d 185 (Neb. 1994). A detailed consideration of the case may
be found in Jeffery R. Kirkpatrick, Restraining Agency Action: Administrative
Discretion and Adoption of Statutes by Reference in Clemens v. Harvey, 75 NEB.
L. REV. 621 (1996). Another interesting delegation case involving Medicaid is
Diversified Investment Partnership v. Dep 't of Social & Health Services, 775
P.2d 947 (Wash. 1989), which examined a state statute providing that when any
provision of state law created a conflict with federal law that threatened the loss
of federal funding, the state provisions in conflict were automatically rendered
inoperative. The statute then authorized the implementing state agency to
promulgate an interim rule amending any existing regulations and provided for
submission of changes to the state legislature. Id. at 948-49. Changes to the
federal Medicaid program subsequently created such a conflict, and the state
provision declaring any conflicting state provisions inoperative was challenged
as an unconstitutional surrender of power to the federal government. Id. at 949.
The Washington Supreme Court determined otherwise. It noted that the general
rule that the legislature may properly condition the operative effect of a statute
upon a future event specified in the law and that this does not transfer the state
legislative power to render judgment to the persons or entity capable of bringing
about that event. Id. at 952.
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medical services to certain "caretaker relatives" who were not
eligible for Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) benefits because
their income or resources were above the ADC standard, but were
low enough to make them eligible for the medical assistance
benefits. 287 At the time the operative Nebraska statute adopted
federal Medicaid law, these "caretaker relative" provisions were
mandatory, but federal law was subsequently amended to make
them optional.2 88 In reliance upon this change in federal law, the
state agency overseeing Medicaid subsequently eliminated these
benefits administratively, without seeking any amendment of the
Nebraska statute.289
The Nebraska Supreme Court noted that the state statute had
incorporated the federal Medicaid legislation at a time when these
benefits were mandatory and concluded that it would be an
unconstitutional delegation of constitutional authority for that
statute to adopt later federal changes without legislative
consideration.290 It therefore ruled that the caretaker relative
benefits remained in force in Nebraska until changed by state law.
The Clemens case thus illustrates that cooperative federalism
requires adequate supporting legal authority to be enacted by both
the state and the federal government. It is obvious that without
overarching federal statutory authority, no cooperative program
even exists. Notwithstanding provisions of federal law however, a
state agency without adequate state statutory authority to do so
The court's decision seems perfectly correct on that point, but it begs the
question as to the authority for the new interim regulations. Perhaps the wrong
state provision was challenged, for it is seldom that the simple repeal of
inconsistent authority would leave in place adequate state authority to allow the
agency to automatically conform its regulations to the new federal provisions.
287. Clemens, 525 N.W.2d at 187.
288. Id. at 188-89.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 189. See also similar issues involving food stamp programs.
State v. Gill, 584 N.E.2d 1200 (Ohio 1992) (upholding a statute incorporating
federal food stamp law "as amended" and adopting only those provisions that
existed on that date); State v. Rodriquez, 365 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1978)
(interpreting a statute providing that any person who knowingly uses food
stamps in any manner not authorized by federal food stamp law to refer to law
and regulations in effect at the time the statute was enacted to preserve its
constitutionality); State v. Williams, 583 P.2d 251 (Ariz. 1978) (declaring a
portion of a reference to future federal legislation on use of food stamps an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power).
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cannot comply with federal standards. While not an issue in the
Clemens case because of the fact that the state law mandated
greater benefits than were optional in the federal program, in other
circumstances a lack of state authority to comply with required
federal standards could result in loss of funding and failed
implementation of the program. 29 1 Thus the statutory structures by
which a state incorporates federal law by reference are of critical
importance.
C. Accountable Intermediaries
The cases discussed above demonstrate that fidelity to the need
for both nationwide uniformity and flexibility on the one hand and
independent state legal authority on the other can make
implementation of cooperative federalism programs especially
tricky.292 Two universally recognized exceptions to the non-
delegation doctrine can help. Contingency legislation and
subsidiary legislation can be combined in a statutory structure that
can survive scrutiny under the non-delegation doctrine.
Contingent legislation arises when a legislative body creates a
law and provides that all or a portion of it is to take effect only
upon the happening of a given fact or contingency. 293 A legislative
body may delegate to executive agents or boards the power to
determine this fact or state of affairs upon which the effectiveness
of the law depends. Conditioning the operative effect of
legislation upon the happening of a future event specified by the
legislative body is not a delegation of legislative power to the
persons or entity capable of bringing about that event or
determining that it has occurred.294 However, the legislation must
291. West Virginia v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281
(4th Cir. 2002) (finding that a lack of West Virginia legislation to implement
changes to federal Medicaid law risked loss of all or part of its funding).
292. Rossi, supra note 275, outlines tensions that can be present in
cooperative federalism programs, reviews several approaches state courts have
used to address them, and suggests interpretations of state separation of power
doctrine that are less independent and more integrated into a federal
constitutional whole.
293. Samuel Mermin, "Cooperative Federalism" Again: State and
Municipal Legislation Penalizing Violation of Existing and Future Federal
Requirements, 57 YALE L. J.1, 9 (1947).
294. See, e.g., The Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813); Diversified Inv.
P'ship v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 775 P.2d 947 (Wash 1989) (ruling that
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be complete in itself. It is the operative effect of the legislation,
and not its content, that is made contingent upon the fact or
event.295
Subsidiary legislation might be defined as the implementing
legal instruments issued by a designated agent pursuant to power
delegated by a superior governing law. The non-delegation
a state statutory provision in conflict with federal Medicaid property
reimbursement is not an incorporation of future federal law or an
unconstitutional transfer of legislative power); State v. Dumler, 559 P.2d 798
(Kan. 1977) (holding a provision in a statute regulating highway speeds
providing that it would expire on the date when Congress removed all
restrictions on maximum speed limits not to be an adoption of future federal
legislation or an unconstitutional delegation); People v. Parker, 359 N.E.2d 348
(N.Y. 1976) (finding that a statute which defined "predicate felony" under the
former habitual offender statute as a crime for which imprisonment exceeding
one year could be imposed, regardless of whether crime was committed in New
York or out-of-state, did not result in delegation of legislative power, but that
the New York definition of "felony" applied to crimes committed in other
jurisdictions, a factual determination, and thus there was no adoption of statutes
of another state); Gibson Prod. Co. v. Murphy, 100 P.2d 453 (Okla. 1940)
(upholding a provision of the Oklahoma Unemployment Compensation Act
prescribing that it is ineffective if the Federal Social Security Act is declared
invalid).
295. Such contingent legislation is similar to another exception to the non-
delegation doctrine: the determination of scientific or statistical facts. In
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 455 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1984), a
state department determined future fuel price adjustments by applying a
statutory formula. The formula utilized changes in the average monthly gasoline
price component of the Consumer Price Index issued periodically by the United
States Department of Labor. Id. at 315. Eastern Air Lines, citing the
incorporation by reference doctrine, argued that this statutory incorporation of
future publications of another government entity was an unconstitutional
delegation. Id. at 316. The Florida Supreme Court declined to so hold.
Although the opinion contains no precise exposition of the court's reasoning,
mention is made that the statutory power of the U.S. Secretary of Labor is to
collect, collate, and report statistics. Id. at 315. The court also notes that the
Florida statute incorporated the federal index for the purposes of making a
ministerial determination, and that there was no incorporation of "federal
statutes or administrative rules which substantively change the law." Id. at 316.
The court seems to be recognizing that no delegation took place because
publication of the Consumer Price Index is not a statement of law or policy in
any sense, but merely a reporting of objective facts that exist outside of any
decision to be made by the federal agency. Id. at 316-17. The publication of an
index of price information constitutes a ministerial act, not the exercise of
discretion. Cf Presbyterian Homes of Synod of Florida v. Wood, 297 So. 2d
556 (Fla. 1974) (holding the granting of tax exemptions depending upon income
limitations unconstitutional because the limitations were governed by policy
determinations made by the federal government).
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doctrine as interpreted in all fifty states allows legislative bodies to
delegate to its administrative agents. A fairly recent survey
concluded that a large majority of the states 296 require that the
delegating statute contain sufficient standards or principles to
govern these agencies in their exercise of discretion. These
statutory standards not only provide guidance to the agency but
also provide a basis for legislative oversight and judicial review. A
small minority of states 97allow delegation to an agent if sufficient
procedural safeguards are in place.
2 98
The legislative standards approach applicable in most states
creates a distinction between validly delegated "administrative"
power and invalidly delegated "legislative" power.299  The
296. Gary Greco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation
Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567 (1994), concluded that all but
six states require either strict or loose standards; the remaining six require only
procedural safeguards.
297. Id. at 598-99 (identifying only California, Iowa, Maryland, Oregon,
Washington, and Wisconsin as following the procedural safeguards approach).
298. The Florida Supreme Court summarized the procedural safeguards
approach associated with Professor Kenneth Culp Davis and explained its
rejection in Florida in Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 922-25
(Fla. 1978) ("Professor Davis maintains that there should be a shift in emphasis
from legislatively imposed standards for administrative action to procedural
safeguards in the administrative process .... The Davis view is an entirely
reasonable one as demonstrated by its adoption in the federal courts and a
minority of state jurisdictions, nonetheless, it clearly has not been the view in
Florida . . . . Until the provisions of Article II, Section 3 of the Florida
Constitution are altered by the people we deem the doctrine of non-delegation of
legislative power to be viable in this State.").
299. Perhaps the most widely quoted test was set forth in Cincinnati,
Wilmington & Zanesville Railroad Co. v. Clinton County Comm'rs, 1 Ohio St.
77, 88-89 (Ohio 1852) ("The true distinction, therefore, is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as
to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution,
to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the latter no valid objection can be made."). See Taxpayers of Mich. Against
Casinos v. State, 732 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. 2007); Opinion of the Justices, 892 So.
2d 332 (Ala. 2004); Carmel Valley Fire Prot. Dist. v. State, 20 P.3d 533 (Cal.
2001); Joytime Distribs. & Amusement Co., Inc. v. State, 528 S.E.2d 647 (S.C.
1999); Opinion of the Justices, 725 A.2d 1082 (N.H. 1999); Mead v. Arnell, 791
P.2d 410 (Idaho 1990); Von Ruden v. Miller, 642 P.2d 91 (Kan. 1982); Madison
Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 216 N.W.2d 533 (Wis. 1974);
Dixon v. Zick, 500 P.2d 130 (Colo. 1972); Pine v. Leavitt, 445 P.2d 942 (Nev.
1968); State v. Rivera, 149 N.W.2d 127 (Iowa 1967); State ex rel. State Park &
Recreation Comm'n v. N.M. State Auth., 411 P.2d 984 (N.M. 1966); Remington
Arms Co. v. G.E.M. of St. Louis, Inc., 102 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 1960);
Remington Arms Co. v. Skaggs, 345 P.2d 1085 (Wash. 1959); Graves v.
Johnson, 63 N.W.2d 341 (S.D. 1954); City of Alexandria v. Alexandria Fire
2008] 1275
6LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
distinction lies in the sufficiency of the standards included within
the delegation. If the legislature has included sufficient standards
in the delegation, then it is found to have only delegated
administrative power to carry the law out pursuant to those
standards. If the legislature has not included sufficient standards to
bind the delegatee and provide for judicial review, then it has
delegated legislative power to make the law, and such delegation is
found to be constitutionally invalid.
The delineation of applicable standards saves an otherwise
unconstitutional delegation, because the administrative agent is
obliged by law to follow the guiding standards in exercising the
delegation and courts can require compliance with those standards.
It follows that standards which do not provide such guidance, or
delegatees who are not obliged to follow them, will result in an
unconstitutional delegation. Nevertheless, cases occasionally
suggest that the presence of legislative standards in an external
reference might somehow authorize the adoption of subsequent
changes. 30 0 These cases attempt to use the concept of subsidiary
Fighters Ass'n, Local No. 540, 57 So. 2d 673 (La. 1952); Terrell v. Loomis, 235
S.W.2d 961 (Ark. 1951); Robertson v. Schein, 204 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1947);
State ex rel. Nelson v. Butler, 17 N.W.2d 683 (Neb. 1945); Bailey v. State Bd.
of Pub. Affairs, 153 P.2d 235 (Okla. 1944); Chester County Inst. Dist. v.
Commonwealth, 17 A.2d 212 (Pa. 1941); First Suburban Water Util. Dist. v.
McCanless, 146 S.W.2d 948 (Tenn. 1941); Milk Comm'n v. Dade County
Dairies, 200 So. 83 (Fla. 1940); Williamson v. Hous. Auth., 199 S.E. 43 (Ga.
1938): Dunn v. City of Indianapolis, 196 N.E. 528 (Ind. 1935); Van Winkle v.
Fred Meyer, Inc., 49 P.2d 1140 (Or. 1935); State ex rel. Orr v. Kearns, 264 S.W.
775 (Mo. 1924); Biffer v. City of Chicago, 116 N.E. 182 (I11. 1917); Armour &
Co. v. City of Richmond, 87 S.E. 609 (Va. 1915); O'Neill v. Yellowstone
Irrigation Dist., 121 P. 283 (Mont. 1912); Clyde v. Cummings, 101 P. 106 (Utah
1909); Dent v. United States, 71 P. 920 (Ariz. 1903); Kennedy v. Mayor of
Pawtucket, 53 A. 317 (R.I. 1902); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ins. Comm'r, 473
A.2d 933 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984); Martin v. State Liquor Auth., 252
N.Y.S.2d 365 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964); Two Guys from Harrison, Inc. v. Furman,
156 A.2d 57 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1959); Ferch v. Hous. Auth., 59 N.W.2d
849 (N.D. 1953); In re Blackstone, 190 A. 597 (Del. Super. Ct. 1937).
300. Consider the curious dicta of State ex rel. Ware v. City of Miami, 107
So. 2d 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958), in which the court invalidated a city
ordinance purporting to require written certification from the Florida State
Welfare Board as a condition of city renewal of a nursery license. The third
district went on to suggest that had the city included as part of its ordinance the
guides or standards to be applied by the State Board in determining the
applicant's fitness, the ordinance would have been valid. Id. at 388. There is of
course no legal authority for a city to prescribe the standards which must be
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legislation directly, by providing in the adopting legislation that
certain standards govern the entity promulgating the referenced
material.
This approach is logically flawed. The external body
promulgating the referenced material is, by definition, not an agent
of the adopting governmental entity, and so courts cannot compel
compliance with the standards. This principle is quite clear in
cooperative federalism cases. As the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts declared long ago, "No discussion is required to
demonstrate that the Congress of the United States cannot be
treated as a subsidiary board or commission . ,,.3 No state has
legal authority to dictate that the federal government comply with
standards adopted by the state to guide its discretion, and no court
has the power to compel such compliance.
However, the concepts of contingency and subsidiary
legislation have been successfully employed in cooperative
federalism situations through the use of accountable
intermediaries, as discussed in the Brock model, above.
30 2
Accountable intermediaries are bona fide agents of the state,
created under its authority and bound by law to follow standards
prescribed by the state legislature. If constructed properly, a
statute may assign these intermediaries responsibility to utilize
subsidiary legislation to implement state law in response to
changes in federal standards.
In the cooperative federalism context, subsidiary legislation
passing constitutional muster in non-delegation states appears to
applied by a state board. Id. Even if the city had authority to bind a State
Welfare Board in this way, it would be completely impractical to have a state
board apply different standards to each nursery application depending on its city
of origin. See also Comment, Constitutional Law---Validity of State Recovery
Acts Adopting Federal Codes, 33 MICH. L. REv. 597 (1934), which suggested
that the unconstitutionality of attempted state adoption of future federal
administrative codes of fair competition formulated under the National
Industrial Recovery Act might be avoided by inclusion of standards within the
state legislation directed to the federal officers adopting the codes. The
Comment did not discuss how the inclusion of "standards" that would not be
consulted or applied by anyone could somehow affect constitutionality.
Research uncovered no state recovery acts that attempted to include standards
applicable to federal officers adopting the codes.
301. In re Opinion of the Justices, 133 N.E. 453, 454 (Mass. 1921).
302. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
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involve four elements. First, a change in federal standards may not
automatically trigger a change in state law, but under a theory of
contingent legislation may mandate that accountable state agents
take action. °30  Such statutory direction is not a delegation to the
federal government, but only a direction to the accountable
intermediary to take action in response to a contingency that has
occurred.
Second, the accountable intermediary cannot be directed by
state law to automatically adopt subsidiary legislation consistent
with the federal changes. Rather, the action that must be taken
is consideration of changes to state policy. The intermediaries
must be given the opportunity to exercise state discretion to adopt,
or not adopt, such changes. 30
5
Third, in making the determination, accountable intermediaries
must apply30 6 sufficient state statutory criteria. In crafting the
statutory standards guiding agency discretion, such standards as
uniformity, reciprocity, avoidance of federal preemption, or
retention of federal funding could be among other legitimate policy
standards to be considered. It is critical that such "federalism
goals" not be the sole criteria, however, for such a statute would
provide no opportunity for the accountable intermediary to decide
303. State v. Thompson, 627 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1982) (in which the control of
a drug by the federal government triggered mandatory consideration of a
substance, but no substance was automatically controlled in Missouri without
the Missouri Division of Health rulemaking).
304. Hogen v. S.D. State Bd. of Transp., 245 N.W.2d 493 (S.D. 1976)
(holding unconstitutional statutory direction to a state agency to comply with all
future changes in federal billboard or junk yard laws); Seale v. McKennon, 336
P.2d 340 (Or. 1959) (holding unconstitutional statutory direction to a state
agency to adopt as the law of Oregon the future laws of the United States and
regulations of a federal agency).
305. N. Am. Safety Valve Indus., Inc. v. Wolgast, 672 F. Supp. 488 (D. Kan.
1987) (upholding a statute as not unconstitutional because the state agency was
required to review changes to the adopted material made by private industry and
to take further action to adopt them before they became Kansas law).
306. While the statute must contain sufficient criteria, how those criteria
were actually applied to facts is not generally a subject for judicial scrutiny. In
Cilento v. State, 377 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1979), the Florida Supreme Court declined
to examine what, if any, "independent fact-finding efforts" were conducted by
the Florida Legislature in support of its decision to adopt federal schedules of
controlled substances. The court noted, "Where a factual predicate is necessary
to the validity of an enactment, it is to be presumed that the necessary facts were
before the legislature." Id. at 665. The same principle is invoked in support of
subsidiary legislation.
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not to adopt federal changes, no matter how otherwise contrary to
state policy. The result would be mandatory adoption and in
consequence an unconstitutional delegation. 30 7 Federalism goals
should be listed as controlling only when consistent with the other
specified criteria applicable to the program area.
308
Fourth, the intermediary must be required to take affirmative
action to adopt the federal standards. Under the governing statute,
the result in the absence of affirmative state action must be that the
federal standards are not adopted.30 9 State action will take the
form of subsidiary legislation of some kind otherwise consistent
with state law.
The basic challenge in implementation of cooperative
federalism programs is to allow federal standard makers sufficient
flexibility to effect periodic changes in uniformly applicable
standards while at the same time preserving the federal structure of
our government by allowing each state to affirmatively exercise its
discretion consistent with its own non-delegation doctrine. State
referential legislation drafted following the Brock model as
described here can substantially achieve these goals.
There is of course a time delay associated with such affirmative
state approvals, but subsidiary legislation can be put in place much
more quickly and efficiently than an amended state statute could.
States can even create expedited rulemaking procedures applicable
to the adoption of federal legislation.310 If federal government
agencies implementing cooperative programs could then limit the
frequency of changes to federal standards and provide advance
notice when changes are to be made, near seamless implementation
could be achieved in many cases.
307. Lee v. State, 635 P.2d 1282 (Mont. 1981) (statute directing attorney
general to proclaim speed limit required by federal law to receive federal
highway funds was unconstitutional).
308. See Brock v. Superior Court, 71 P.2d 209 (Cal. 1937).
309. State v. Dougall, 570 P.2d 135 (Wash. 1977) (unconstitutional
delegation occurred because statute permitted future federal designations of
controlled substances to become controlled under state law by means of Board
inaction or acquiescence).
310. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 120.54(6) (2007) (providing a twenty-one day
process for the adoption of federal standards).
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
If your Majesty will only tell me the right way to begin, I'll
do it as well as I can. 
311
On first glance, looking-glass law seems simple enough. Why
not replace lengthy text with a simple reference to an identical
version already published elsewhere? As has been shown,
however, the drafter or interpreter of legislation who, like Alice,
takes the time to explore behind this deceptively smooth surface,
will find a topsy-turvy world of possibly unexpected
consequences.
Incorporation by reference is at heart nothing more than a
drafting technique to avoid the time and expense of setting forth all
of the referenced language verbatim in the referencing statute, and
its proper legal interpretation is just the same as if that more
tedious task had in fact been done. However, the very omission of
language creates the first danger inherent in reference legislation:
confusion in determining exactly what was adopted. Statutes using
incorporation by reference have been declared invalid for
uncertainty when it was impossible at the time of application to
identify the adopted provisions or when references were found so
broad as to be unacceptably vague.
A greater number of unexpected consequences have arisen
from the modification of incorporation by reference doctrine to
allow automatic adoption of subsequent changes in the material to
be adopted by the referencing provision if that was the legislative
intent. The prospective adoption of changes that necessarily
remain unknown at the time of enactment imparts an entirely new
level of uncertainty, and courts in some cases have simply refused
to so interpret a legislative reference depending on the nature of
the subsequent changes.
The judicially devised Dexter presumption has not brought
more certainty to the law, but has exacerbated problems. The
general rule seems clear enough:
When a statute adopts by specific reference the provisions
of another statute, regulation, or ordinance, such provisions
311. CARROLL, supra note 1, at 172 (Alice).
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are incorporated in the form in which they exist at the time
of the reference, and not as subsequently modified;
whereas, where the reference is general, such as a reference
to a system or body of laws or to the general law relating to
the subject in hand, the referring statute takes the law or
laws not only in their contemporary form but also as they
may be changed from time to time.
312
But the distinction between specific and general references can
be difficult to apply in practice. More importantly, the
presumption often fails to reflect the likely actual intention of the
legislative body or the usual expectation of most readers,
especially when applied to cross-references-a second inherent
danger.
Finally, attempted incorporation of the future legislation of a
different governmental or private body is often declared
unconstitutional as an improper delegation of legislative power.
The invalidation of reference legislation can frustrate legislative
intent to maintain inter-jurisdictional consistency, particularly in
state implementation of federal programs under concepts of
cooperative federalism.
Several mechanisms and structures may be put in place to
address these issues. Electronic filing of incorporated material has
the potential to substantially eliminate most vagueness issues by
identifying exactly what material has been adopted. The second
issue-faithful implementation of legislative intent as to whether
an adoption by reference includes subsequent amendments to the
referenced material--can also be aided tremendously by electronic
linkage. Careful implementation of a system of electronic
hyperlinks by the legislating body can provide the reader with
immediate access to the versions of incorporated material
consistent with legislative intent over time.
Another mechanism to ensure more faithful implementation of
legislative intent regarding fixed and ambulatory references is the
referential legislation construction provision. Construction
provisions providing that cross-references also adopt subsequent
amendments to legislative cross-references, except as expressly
312. Seale v. McKennon, 336 P.2d 340, 345-46 (Or. 1959).
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provided otherwise, provide a better default rule than the Dexter
presumption. 313  Combined with careful use of hyperlink
technology, statutory construction provisions can improve not only
interpretive certainty but also fidelity to actual legislative intent.
The final issue highlighted by this Article--the
unconstitutionality of attempted adoption of legislation yet to be
promulgated by other entities-is perhaps the most critical.
Especially in the cooperative federalism context, incorporation
doctrine often pits the "irresistible force" of central policy
coordination directly against the "immovable object" of state
constitutional law precepts, to the benefit of neither. Minor
structural adjustments in these programs at both the federal and
state levels could restore not only consistency with state non-
delegation doctrine but also the very "cooperative" element
deemed so essential for their success. The seemingly insoluble
dilemma of either maintaining uniformity over time or
alternatively providing for affirmative state assent is at its core
little more than a timing problem.314 With federal administrative
cooperation, state acceptance through action by accountable
intermediaries consistent with the Brock model could substantially
reduce non-delegation concerns.
The review of incorporation by reference attempted here was
too broad to cover the many variations and inconsistencies that
exist across the states, of course, but it did discern common
principles in interpretation of this historic doctrine. The courts of
the various states, each interpreting the doctrine in light of that
state's own constitution, created ways to address many of the
dangers inherent in reference legislation and have prepared a
foundation for new ideas-such as electronic hyperlinks to
313. Florida does not have a universal statutory construction provision
relating to adoptions by reference, though it has adopted more focused
provisions in a few instances. Several other states do have more universal
statutory construction provisions relating to adoptions by reference. See supra
Part IV.D.
314. While there may be rare instances when state legislatures actually
oppose implementation of state programs consistent with federal standards, in
the author's experience these are extremely rare. The mechanisms of contingent
funding and partial preemption--those twin workhorses of cooperative
federalism---usually provide ample incentive. Concern is more often with
maintaining consistency with such federal standards without unconstitutionally
abdicating state legislative authority as interpreted by the state's courts.
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incorporated material-that promise even greater success. The
doctrine remains viable. 315 As incorporation by reference outgrew
its humble origins as a simple space saving technique and was
transformed into a device used to adopt the future legislation of
other governmental entities, the legal doctrines governing its use
took on infinitely greater importance. Incorporation by reference
doctrine implicates nothing less than the fundamental allocation of
governmental power in our society and is worthy of far more
attention by courts and legislative bodies than it has usually
received.
315. Some recent cases include: Young Partners, LLC v. Bd. of Educ., 160
P.3d 830 (Kan. 2007) (holding that adoption of statute by reference makes it as
much a part of the later statute as though it had been incorporated at full length);
Johnsen v. State, 269 Neb. 790 (Neb. 2005) (holding that the effect of a specific
reference is the same as if the adopted language had been written out); Haw.
Providers Network, Inc. v. AIG Haw. Ins. Co., Inc., 98 P.3d 233 (Haw. 2004)
(holding that a general reference adopts prospectively future alterations
including repeal of the incorporated law); Pentagon Acad., Inc. v. Ind. Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 82 P.3d 587 (Okla. 2003) (finding that a reference statute adopts other
statutes and makes them applicable to the subject of the legislation); Cloyd v.
State, 943 So. 2d 149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding a statute incorporating
federal regulations to be adopted in the future unconstitutional to that extent);
Jager v. Rostagno Trucking Co., Inc., 728 N.W.2d 467 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006)
(holding that a referenced provision becomes part of the legislative enactment as
it existed at the time of the legislation without subsequent amendments); Plastic
Pipe & Fittings Ass'n v. Cal. Bldg. Standards Comm'n, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 393
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (suggesting the court would construe the statute to require
affirmative government approval to avoid unconstitutional adoption of future
changes to referenced building standards); Ball Corp. v. Fisher, 51 P.3d 1053
(Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (determining that a statute specifically incorporating
enumerated provisions adopts them at the time of the adoption, without
subsequent amendments, absent express legislative declaration to the contrary).
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